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v) ABSTRACT 
Do technical solutions override or fast track institutional reforms? This study interrogates the extent to 
which Zambia’s newly introduced Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) is addressing the 
procurement challenges [for essential drugs and medical supplies] in the Ministry of Health (MoH). A brain 
child of the Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA), the e-GP is but one of the components of the 
wider procurement reform agenda. The e-GP was introduced with the intention of enhancing efficiency, 
effectiveness and Value for Money (VfM) in public procurement. Since 2016, ZPPA has been piloting the 
approach in selected Procurement Entities (PEs), a combination of sector ministries and state parastatals. 
Based on review of project documentation, publicly available data, and interviews from key stakeholders; 
the study explores and interrogates the contextual and institutional challenges characterising the e-GP 
design and pilot implementation phases, and the extent to which these   realities   impact   the   achievement   
of   the   intended   outcomes.    
A fair amount of information from interviewees was provided under conditions of confidentiality, thus 
individuals are not often identified. 
It is perhaps too early to ascertain the extent to which the e-GP is realising the intended objectives. This is 
partly explained by the project’s slow start, occasioned by delayed procurement which had knock - on 
effects on the overall project’s pace. An interrogation of the history   and political economy of Zambia 
suggests   however that it is the opaque challenges bordering on the political economy which is the single 
most binding constraint to reforms; defining the process, the pace and outcomes.  The design of the e-GP 
was generic and non-participatory.  There is no evidence to suggest that the process had provided 
opportunity for PE’s to define and customize the problems that mattered for them to be addressed by the 
e-GP. Instead, the e-GP seems to have been sold to PEs as a best practice solution. 
Because of the deep incentive fabric at both organizational and individual levels, the project seems to have 
some traction.  Effort of various actors does not appear to be supportive of each, often latently 
contradicting each other. Project progress is held constant by the relative ability of the ZPPA to push some 
strands of work within some pilot PEs. This relative ability of the ZPPA shields the low levels of acceptance 
and questionable authority within PEs and among   actors.   Progress   on   the   e-GP   appears   like   a   
façade   of   success; suggestive   of isomorphic mimicry. 
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1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction to chapter 
Public procurement is a necessary function of government in the delivery of goods and services to 
citizens. In both developed and developing countries, public procurement attracts interest from 
cross sections of society, largely because of the size of state resources allocated to procurement 
expenditure and the complexity or nature of the procurement processes. Like any other public 
sector, the procurement sector is evidently further complicated by globalisation, technological 
advancements and the nature of politics, among others. But the sector is also clearly dynamic, 
often adapting to changes in the context at various advancements or moments in time. 
Globally, electronic procurement (e-procurement) is an example of the sector’s ability to adapt 
with technological advances. Procurement practitioners and the academia are investing in 
understanding the value addition of technology to the procurement processes and outcomes in 
both the public and private sector. 
A review of existing literature on the value of e-procurement can broadly be summed up as viewing 
technology as a means of attaining what the United Kingdom’s (UK) Department for International 
Development (DFID) would perhaps classify as Value for Money (VfM). We lightly borrow from 
DFID’s approach of VfM: broken down as i) economy - right cost; ii) efficiency - spending well; iii) 
effectiveness - spending wisely; iii) equity - closing divides among various players (for instance 
gender, geography) (DFID) to contextualize and interrogate the outcomes being pursued under 
Zambia’s Electronic Government Procurement (e-GP) agenda. The public procurement sector is 
also alive to transparency, inclining to consider e-procurement as a means to enhancing 
transparency. 
Launched in July 2016, the e-GP is meant to ‘enhance efficiency and transparency’ of public 
procurement by streamlining procurement processes and tightening controls on spending. The e-
GP introduces Information Technology (IT) in the procurement system including web- based 
procurement portal, e-bidding, e-purchasing, and e-Contract management. It is driven by the 
Zambia Public Procurement Authority (ZPPA), also referred to as the ‘Authority’ in this 
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dissertation), which is anchoring the procurement component under the Public Finance 
Management Reform Programme (PFMRP). 
The PFMRP is financed through a Multi Donor Trust Fund in which the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
Department for International Development (DFID), Finland and Germany are participants.  It is 
implemented by the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) through a dedicated unit in the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF). The World Bank (WB) is the programme administrator; responsible for 
Technical Assistance (TA); carrying out controls and fiduciary oversight over participating donors. 
Guided by the Public Procurement Act (PPA) No.12 of 2008, the ZPPA controls and regulates public 
procurement in Zambia. Under the PFMRP, the Authority is implementing reforms aimed at 
strengthening its oversight and regulatory role in public procurement. The development and 
adoption of a nationwide e-procurement system is lined up as one of the key reform initiatives. 
Seven (7) selected Ministries, Parastatals and Spending Agencies (MPSAs) 1 are participating in the 
pilot. MoH is one of the participants in this two - part process which includes: i) a pilot 
implementation phase and ii) the full roll out of the system to the public procurement sector. 
Among the outcomes ZPPA anticipates from the e-GP  are: i) increased transparency, ii) widened 
participation of geographically spread bidders in procurement, iii) reduction in unethical conduct 
of procurement entities (PEs) and bidders; iii)  improved contract management; iv) improved 
efficiency –reduction in evaluation time and v) reduction in the use of paper in the manual process 
(ZPPA ((?)). 
In the health sector, public procurement is critical in ensuring that essential drugs and medical 
supplies are available timely for users, and as close as possible at the point of need. Procurement 
is thus directly linked to health outcomes. This study generally attempts to understand how e-
procurement is or is not being used to respond to some of the long standing institutional 
challenges of procurement in the health sector supply chain, such as: limited accountability due 
to participation of multiple actors; expiries and drug stock- outs; leakages across national borders; 
corruption; increased drug debt burden and weaknesses in the storage and distribution system. 
 
                                                          
1 MoH, Ministry of General Education, Compensation House in Ndola, Muchinga Provincial Administrative Office, Ndola City Council and ZPPA 
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1.2. Purpose of the Study 
This study examines the extent to which the newly introduced (pilot) Electronic Government 
Procurement (e-GP) is answering to the institutional procurement limitations; bordering on VfM 
and transparency in Zambia. 
We take the case of Zambia’s Ministry of Health (MoH), specifically zeroing in on some key 
bottlenecks in the procurement of essential medicines and medical supplies to understand the 
implications of introducing technology in the procurement process; in a sector that is close to the 
care of multiple stakeholders: citizens, the polity, bureaucracy, development and business 
partners. 
 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
Procurement Audits from Zambia’s various Ministries, Parastatals and Spending Agencies (MPSAs), 
as well as the office of the Auditor General (AG) show general lack of compliance to procurement 
rules and procedures (World Bank, 2014:16). 
Within the health supply chain, procurement challenges are multiple and multi-faceted and 
include: - heavy handedness of the MoH in selection, quantification and procurement; limited 
accountability due to participation of multiple actors; expiries and drug stock- outs; increasing 
drug debt; leakages across national borders; corruption; increased drug debt burden and 
weaknesses in the storage and distribution among others (EU, 2015 and NSCS, 2014). Fortunately, 
there also seems consensus on the solutions to addressing most of the identified challenges, as 
evidenced by recommendations from various analyses, such as the (EU 2015, ibid) and (Thim P / 
MoH, 2015). 
Yet, there is a general phenomenon that requires unpacking: - actions leading to implementation 
of the stated objectives or analyses do not often flow according to plans. They either stall, progress 
slowly or are simply abandoned while new interventions are continuously being introduced.  In 
fact, Zambia is renowned in development circles as a country with perfect plans that are hardly 
implemented. 
Deferred or dragged implementation of strategic decisions such as the transfer of the 
procurement function from MoH to MSL while other reforms that seem to change only the form 
and not the function of the organisations or ‘rules of the game’ prompt interrogation. Would the 
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e-GP fall into a similar conundrum? Could this phenomenon be suggestive or characteristic of 
‘isomorphic mimicry’? (North, 1990; Andrews, 2013). 
We attempt to explore the extent to which policy and strategic imperatives stir or constrain 
realisation of the stated objectives, particularly those bordering on the procurement function. 
This study recognises that the reasons behind obstacles, decisions or lack of decisions or 
implementation failures are often complex and multiple and may not only necessarily reside in the 
implementing or sponsoring agencies but, could be spread across the spectrum of stakeholders, 
and underpinned by the political economy surrounding the reforms. We explore possible answers 
from as many dimensions and stakeholders as possible, while focusing on the Design and Pilot 
implementation phases of the e-GP. 
1.4. Research Question (s) 
The study interrogates the extent to which the e-GP design and pilot considers the institutional 
and contextual challenges of the procurement of essential drugs and medical supplies. 
To what extent is the e-GP addressing the procurement challenges [for essential drugs and medical 
supplies] in the MoH? 
 
The study poses the following hypothesis: 
 
The implementers of the e-GP within the MoH adopted it, not as a means to better address their 
procurement challenges, but in order to win legitimacy from external stakeholders – without 
actually addressing / confronting the underlying interests and incentives which shape how 
procurement is implemented in practice. The result was ‘isomorphic mimicry’ – with 
implementation seemingly moving forward, but with few if any of the actual challenges of 
procurement being addressed. 
 
The rest of the dissertation is arranged as follows: Chapter two presents the literature review; 
Chapter three describes the research methodology; Chapter four presents the research context, 
through a historical timeline of Zambia’s evolving de jure and defacto system of procurement, in 
the absence of e-GP. Chapter five discusses the research findings, taking a specific focus on MoH’s 
implementation of the e-GP. Chapter six briefly presents the study implications and conclusion. 
14 
 
1.5. Contribution of the Study 
It is envisaged that this study would contribute to: i) unpacking what constitutes success in 
complex reform contexts or scenarios ii) how to define success or problems when confronted with 
wicked development problems iii) informing forward thinking or packaging of similar reform 
agenda. 
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2. CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter provides definitions and foundation of significant developments in public 
procurement, taking a deep dive into e-procurement as a procurement method and envisaged 
benefits or outcomes. Where possible, reference is made to examples of where and / or when the 
e-GP has been successfully used to resolve challenges in public procurement. The chapter also 
shades light on some enablers and constraints to reform of public procurement in developing 
countries, with a focus on Zambia. 
 
2.2. Background to Procurement Reforms 
Prior to 1995, most developing countries’ procurement systems were based on old pieces 
legislation inherited from the colonial era. Following the African Development Bank (ADB) 
procurement conference held in Ghana in 1998, countries agreed a reform agenda, aimed at 
ensuring that their procurement systems conformed to international standards.  A standard 
baseline including: reforming laws and regulations; creation of a procurement regulatory 
authority; training of a professional cadre and structural institutional arrangements informed the 
reform agenda (OECD, 2005). “It is therefore unsurprising that the definition of the reform agenda, 
components of reforms, or stages of reforms among African countries is not different” (Basheka, 
2009). 
The creation of public procurement regulation authorities in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda out of 
organisations that previously existed as Central Tender Boards is an example of the uniformity in 
reforms that countries undertook (Basheka, ibid). Zambia’s ZPPA was also created after abolition 
of the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB). Consequently, new legal reforms to pave way for 
structural and functional changes in the new ZPPA were undertaken (ZPPA website). The 
reorganised authorities have been responsible for leading on subsequent reforms and providing 
capacity development support to other public agencies in respective countries (Basheka, ibid). 
 
Despite several years of reform, the Zambian procurement system is still work in progress, 
necessitated by several factors in the context. For instance, the 2016 constitutional change 
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triggered changes to other subsidiary legislation which have a bearing on the Procurement Act of 
2008. In the same vein, e-procurement is an example of a strand of procurement reform which 
the country has embarked on, arising out of the current procurement context but is not reinforced 
by the law. 
 
2.3. Defining and Contextualising e-Procurement 
Early and recent works in procurement regard e-procurement as the “integrated use of web-based 
processes in the conduct of all of the purchasing process…” (Croom and Brandon-Jones, 2007); and 
or simply “... the process of providing goods and services using technology” (Weele (1994). 
Lee (2010: 407) distinguishes between e-government and e-procurement. E-government is much 
wider and includes the relationship between government as a service provider and the citizens as 
customers of public services, while e-procurement involves the relationship between 
governments as buyers and companies as suppliers, mainly for the purposes of reduction of 
administrative costs and achieving quality of public goods and services. E-procurement arguably 
thrives in contexts where e-government systems are strong. 
Recently, e-procurement has been on countries’ reform agenda. Zambia’s ZPPA considers e-
procurement as a means of achieving VfM, transparency and corporate compliance among others. 
This is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4. Benefits of e-Procurement 
Five key themes are cited in literature as being the benefits of e-procurement: i) changes to total 
acquisition costs; ii) changes to organisational characteristics; iii) changes to governance 
structures; iv) system specifications and v) implementation management (Bruno, Esposito, 
Mastroianni and Vellutino, 2005). 
Reduction in acquisition costs has been cited as benefit of e-procurement. Computerisation and 
cutting down of procurement related tasks saves time for procurement staff / organisations, which 
time can be allocated time to other strategic tasks. Making available a wide selection of suppliers 
or bidders is another benefit of e-procurement. The wide and broad network of suppliers and 
bidders fosters healthy competition, which could lead to price reductions. The use of electronic 
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systems makes management of information and records simple2. Because purchase information 
is stored electronically, organisations can analyse both costs and spending patterns easily. The 
potential to cut out middle persons or intermediaries in the procurement process is another 
benefit of e-procurement (Kheng and Al- Hawamdeh, 2002: 65). These benefits broadly fit into the 
classification of e-procurement contributing to realisation of VfM. 
Providing all bidders equal opportunity to compete for the bidding process is one of the prospects 
of the e-GP which literature and proponents cite (Kheng and Al- Hawamdeh, ibid). But for the 
benefits of e-procurement, especially in the acquisition of public goods and services to be realised 
by all stakeholders, technological infrastructure such as websites should be available.  The 
infrastructure should also be accessible and useable, i.e designed in such a way that non-computer 
science specialists or persons with disability can easily access them). For both access and use to 
be achieved, (Bruno, et al, 2005) and (Croom and Brandon- Jones, 2007), argue against separating 
the two concepts of acceptability and usability because they are complimentary and not 
independent of each other. 
E-procurement provides an opportunity for open and effective processes for sharing information 
across stakeholders in a transparent manner. Openness or transparency of processes in the 
context of procurement minimizes the risk of fraud and corruption while transparency enables 
stakeholders to understand the actual means and processes by which public contracts are 
awarded (Croom and Brandon -Jones, 2007; Auriol, Straub and Flochel, 2015). 
E-procurement has prospects of improving the relationships between citizens and governments 
through transparency for the administrative action and participation of citizens (Croom and 
Brandon -Jones, 2007). Croom and Brandon further found that e-procurement contributed to 
changes in the governance characteristics of organisations. However, the sustainability of the 
changes to governance characteristics requires that principles of ethics and integrity are 
embedded in citizens and that the context provides citizens and other stakeholders the space and 
freedoms to demand for accountability (Basheka, 2006). 
 
                                                          
2 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/09/05/how-rwanda-became-the-first-african-country-with-an-electronic-procurement-
system 
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2.5. E-procurement Adoption and Implementation 
Literature depicts progress in terms of use and adoption of various forms of technology in the 
procurement cycle (Bartels et al 2006:6). Research also suggests a desire by government entities 
to adopt both e-government and e-procurement (McManus, 2002). But the scale of adoption and 
implementation of e-procurement in most countries has not matched the forecasts predicted by 
various stakeholders (Croom and Brandon-Jones (2007), not only because e-government is least 
developed but also other reasons largely associated with countries’ political economy. 
Lee (2006:407) offers a political economy lens to the e-procurement discourse and practice. The 
proposition is that e-procurement systems in government should be evaluated as “aspects of 
political and economic agendas more than as technical problems”.  Indeed, a review of 
procurement reforms found that “support from the highest political levels “is the first step to the 
success of the reforms”. Political will signals and assures government’s commitment to the reform 
agenda (Lee, ibid). 
In an analysis of Zambia and Bangladesh, Levy; (2014:82) notes that Zambia is a personalized 
competitive economy in which “rents, capture and allocation is integral to the political processes.” 
In this set up, systems appear stable not because of observance to the formal laws, regulations or 
procedures but because the interests and incentives of various actors are consistent with those of 
the various actors. The dysfunctional nature of the governance systems manifests in how often 
informal rules prevail over formal arrangements. Implicitly, the interests and incentives of various 
actors in the procurement process often shape and /or contribute to the outcome of the reforms 
(i.e. laws, guidelines and regulations) and ultimately practice or implementation (Levy, ibid). 
The perverse interests and incentives perhaps explains why despite good plans and intentions, 
Zambia has a poor record of implementation of formal policies; an example of what could be 
characterised as isomorphic mimicry: “…- that is, governments and organizations pretend to reform by 
changing what policies or organizations look like rather than what they actually do” (Andrews et al 2012: 
12). 
In what is considered as strong political will to drive reform at various levels, Rwanda has set the 
record of being the first country to achieve nationwide roll-out of e-procurement in a short time 
span. The success of the Rwanda case can be seen through the amount of commitment dedicated 
by Rwandese officials to the programme. Though Rwanda commenced its e-GP later than Zambia, 
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its e-procurement - UMUCYO, which means “Transparency” in the local language,” has recently 
received World Bank recognition and it is described as ‘a first3’. 
Like technology in general, e-procurement growth seems to have outpaced the growth of legal 
processes. Most countries have been relatively late in devising legislation and regulations to 
govern e-commerce (Kheng and Al- Hawamdeh, 2002). Zambia is not peculiar to this scenario. In 
fact, the 2008 PPA does not provide for electronic procurement. However, there are plans to have 
e-procurement legalized in the proposed amendment to the PPA 2008 (2017 unofficial version). 
The factors that influence or lead respective government entities to choose e-procurement over 
other forms of procurement methods appear varied and little understood.  Dooley and Purchase 
(2006: 460) conducted research into some of the factors influencing the choice of e-procurement 
usage in Australia. They found that major suppliers’ “willingness and future plans to transact 
online” serve a key role in the acceptance and utilisation of e-procurement systems.   Dooley and 
Purchase’s (ibid) research further highlights the importance of organisations including their major 
suppliers in all phases of e-procurement development; and in communicating the benefits likely 
to accrue to them using e-procurement systems. They show that e-procurement success is not 
only dependent on internal systems but on nurturing external relationships with buyers and 
suppliers. 
Lee, Jung (2010:407) compared Koreas’ case of e-procurement with those of the U.S, Australia and 
New Zealand. The comparison revealed that e-procurement was largely developed and used in 
countries which have adopted central supply methods such as US and Korea. It was less adopted 
and developed in Australia and New Zealand which have adopted dispersive supply methods Lee, 
(2010:407). The less usage of e-procurement in dispersed procurement contexts broadly seems 
like Uganda’s early experience with e-procurement in the mid-1990s. The e-procurement had 
been driven by Uganda’s Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Authority (PPDA). While the 
PPDA had improved its website in readiness for e-procurement use, it was said to have 
encountered challenges of “persuading most entities to place on the website their bid 
opportunities, notices of best evaluated bidder and contract award and other statutory 
information” (Agaba and Shipman (?): 384). 
                                                          
3 http://news-af.op-mobile.opera.com/news/detail/21b5a9d8865b97aeedd7e4c8cb8cb620_zm?share=1&country=zm&language=en 
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Researchers note the complexity of shifting entrenched practices in procurement, especially those 
relating to ‘human deficiencies and faults (i.e. corruption and inefficiency) in the implementation 
process (in Croom and Brandon -Jones, 2007). A Case study of e-commerce in Taiwanese military 
procurement (Liao et al 2003) concurs with the challenges of corruption, lack of qualified staff, 
abuse of public funds and weak transparency encountered in e-procurement implementation. 
However, this finding contrast slightly with Rwanda’s experience, where roll- out of e-procurement 
in the entire country has been done in just under two years; and already gains of minimal 
corruption are being cited.  Apart from political will, the success of the Rwanda project could 
partially be attributed to the fact that there was calculated investment in the both hardware and 
software mechanisms of the project. The hardware included providing equipment for the data 
centre while there was capacity building targeted at various categories of stakeholders. From the 
inception, the project was integrated into the national budget system and procedures.4 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Literature suggests that e-procurement has potential to add value to public procurement 
processes and outcomes. With the right mix of both software (i.e politics, formal and informal 
rules) and hardware (IT equipment) aspects, e-procurement can be utilised to streamline 
processes in order to: improve document storage and retrieval; reduce time and costs spent on 
laborious processes; achieve transparency; mitigate corruption, increase participation of actors in 
the procurement processes; enhance equity of opportunity among bidders. Put together, the 
foregoing contributes to realisation of VfM. Deriving the best outcomes from e-procurement is 
not only dependent on these factors, but on implementers paying attention to the political 
economy of reform and ensuring that the new systems align to existing national budgeting 
procedures. Rwanda’s e-GP [UMUCYO], emerges as an example of what success of a nationwide 
e-procurement system could look like. 
 
                                                          
4  http://news-af.op-mobile.opera.com/news/detail/21b5a9d8865b97aeedd7e4c8cb8cb620_zm?share=1&country=zm&language=en 
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3. CHAPTER 3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter discusses the study’s methodological approach: including sampling, data collection 
and analysis. It concludes by reflecting on some the study limitations and ethical considerations. 
 
3.2. Characteristics of the Study Design 
The study is explanatory and descriptive in nature. We interrogate factors typifying the 
procurement component of the PFMRP, zeroing in on the e-GP. The time frame the study 
considers is mainly around two key phases of the e-GP reforms: - two phases i.e.  Project 
conceptualisation and pilot implementation. 
Throughout the study, flexibility and openness to the possibility of modifying some questions as 
information or answers on the subject became available or clear from implementers, donors, or 
other key stakeholders was retained. However, the main research question remained constant. 
 
3.3. Study Area 
Because most of the stakeholders in this study are based in Lusaka, it became the default study 
area. A brief interview was held with the World Bank’s Washington based (World Bank Task 
Leader) while on Mission in Lusaka in November 2017. The initial proposal had been to extend the 
study to a Provincial Centre in MoH such as Ndola. However, the idea was abandoned when it 
became apparent that no procurement activities utilising the e-GP had taken place at the 
decentralised level within the MoH. 
 
3.4. Sampling 
Informants were purposefully selected, based on a range of criteria: closeness to the project or 
experience with the reforms, power or influence over procurement or general reforms, job 
categories or historical background (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003); or decision making  or authorising 
powers (Andrews, 2013). Sometimes public servants have to go against the norm in order to 
perform certain functions; referred to as ‘positive deviance in literature (Andrews, Ibid) and 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). Thus, we included one stakeholder from another PE – Ministry of 
General Education (MoGE).  The Head of Procurement (HoP) within MoGE was particularly 
22 
 
perceived by ZPPA staff as a positive deviant. In order to triangulate information obtained from 
other key informants, interviews were extended to critical stakeholders in the procurement sector 
as they were suggested by informants. For instance, we had to broaden informants in MSL twice; 
four times in ZPPA; and five times in MoH from the time the first interviews were conducted.  It 
was proposed that the final interviews be conducted with the DG for ZPPA and with the new 
Permanent Secretary (PS) responsible for Administration in MoH. The ZPPA DG declined the 
interview, while effort to schedule appointment with PS was abandoned on the third attempt. 
 
3.5. Data Collection and Data Sources 
Primary data was obtained through interviews with informants who included staff in the lead 
implementing organisations and key stakeholders: - (The World Bank (WB), ZPPA, DFID, MoH, MSL 
ZIPS, Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), Mission Pharma Ltd, Hon. Anthony Mumba and in 
MoGE. Secondary information was obtained from administrative data comprising of reports 
(Quarterly, Bi-annual or Annual; Mission Supervision Reports, Evaluation etc.); Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU), newspaper articles, presentations, journal articles and research studies 
available mainly online. 
 
3.6. Data Analysis 
Using key informants’ detailed narratives and corroborating it with administrative information, we 
teased out what was happening and why at respective moments in time. The iterative data 
collection processes described in the previous section fed into data analysis; providing answers or 
“maps” to various questions or opened up new “mines” of inquiry in some instances (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2003). 
Midway through the data collection, feedback from some stakeholders was provided to ZPPA, 
because ZPPA had expressed interest to understand how the PEs were settling with the e-GP. This 
feedback was well received and ZPPA pointed us to more stakeholders who could possibly add 
their perspectives, widening the number of stakeholders to   triangulate information. 
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3.7. Possible Ethical Considerations 
The e-GP is partly funded by my employer, DFID Zambia through the PFMRP programme. Though 
I have not until this study been close to the project, I am preview to some of the disquiet that 
colleagues working on the project have on what they consider as a blanket approach to fixing 
identified challenges generally in the public sector. During this study, I have tried to watch against 
possible bias by keeping myself in constant check and corroborating views with multiple 
stakeholders. 
Secondly, several respondents agreed to be interviewed as part of the study but requested 
anonymity in the main report findings. While every effort has been made to ensure that their 
confidentiality is protected, achieving total anonymity is complex, given the narrow landscape of 
the procurement sector in the country.  
All errors and omissions are the total responsibility of the researcher. 
 
3.8. Study Limitations 
We were not able to speak to the two controlling officers in ZPPA (DG) and MoH (PS – 
Administration). Their insights and views on the project would have been critical for the conclusion 
of this piece of research.  
Lastly but not this least, it is imperative to place on record the challenge of gathering information 
to evidence the claims made in this study: - i)  it was not easy to secure interviews with 
stakeholders, especially in the public service or former public service employees. Part of the 
reasons for the hesitation in giving interviews are discussed later in the research findings; ii) 
Obtaining written documentation or correspondence on public procurement was near to 
impossible. Zambia has no access to information legislation, which could ideally ease information 
gathering to those that seek it; iii) With respect to information from the media, mention need be 
for the narrowness of Zambia’s media landscape, which has become polarized, and affected 
corruption -related reporting (Monteith, C  and Ough, O 2017: 9).  Narrowness of the landscape 
seems more apparent given the void left by the former Post Newspaper limited after liquidation5  
and6, which appears not to have been filled by the existing media outlets (dominated by the state 
                                                          
5 https://www.zambianobserver.com/edgar-lungu-buries-the-post-newspaper/ 
6 https://diggers.news/courts/2018/01/17/mmembe-challenges-post-liquidation-sues-zra/ 
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owned). For example, the Post Newspaper Online Archives which had partly informed (Roberts 
and Vhilakzi’s study on procurement rigging in the agriculture sector, and widely referenced in this 
study are no longer available online).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
4. CHAPTER 4  ZAMBIA’S EVOLVING SYSTEM OF PROCUREMENT 
 
4.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This section discusses Zambia’s evolving de jure and defacto system of procurement, in the 
absence of e-GP. It is divided in three sections where the first section lays out Zambia’s political 
economic context of reforms; the second section presents the de jure system of procurement 
while the last section discusses the defacto system of procurement. 
 
4.2. The Political Economic Context of Reforms in Zambia 
Zambia has progressive public sector policies but little to demonstrate in terms of implementation 
or improving the lives of ordinary citizens.  For example, the Vision 2030 was conceived in 2006 
and sets a goal for Zambia to become a “prosperous middle –income nation by 2030”. The socio-
economic objective of the vision includes annual economic growth and significant reduction in 
poverty levels while delivering education and health for all. The vision advocates “devolved 
political systems and structures……. (GRZ, 2006:2).” However, the extent to which this vision is 
executed remains questionable. The five-year National Development Plans (NDPs) were re-
introduced in 2006 and should ideally support the realisation of the vision. The NDPs are meant 
to be implemented through decentralised structures stipulated in the Decentralisation Plan of 
2002; (and revised in 2013). But decentralisation has hardly taken off, though political rhetoric 
states otherwise. 
The competitive, personalized political settlement, characterised by centralised power and 
patronage is the main factor constraining genuine and long-term commitment to development in 
Zambia. Dejure and defacto power is centralised in the executive; with the president leading, 
surrounded by selected few gate keepers to his office. It is a widely held view that most controlling 
officers in MPSAs or heads of Parastatals are political appointees, loyal to the party in power. 
Political rules are largely personalized and patronage based. There is weak separation between 
the public and private spheres and informal rules often triumph over the formal, legal or regulatory 
processes (Heinfelaar, 2018; Cheesman, Simutanyi and Yezi, 2015; Levy, 2014). 
Despite several constitutional review processes aimed at limiting presidential prerogative among 
others, change has been elusive. 
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Elites are critical in Zambia’s political settlement, because they are beneficiaries to a rent system, 
which has been sustained by consensus of peaceful exchange of power. Key national decisions are 
often arrived at through intra-elite bargaining rather than formal procedures or institutions (Levy, 
ibid; Cheesman et al, ibid). 
While regular elections are held, with genuine competition and power changing hands, politics is 
fragmented. Moreover, politics is not based on any distinct ideology. This coupled with the winner 
takes all approach encourages political party factionalism; with politicians often crossing from 
party to party. The party in power is often preoccupied with retaining power and silencing 
alternative centres of power. Although the threat of being voted out of power is real, the nature 
of politics limits participants’ ability to concentrate on long term development outcomes; 
frequently focusing and settling on short term policy deliverables; vote winners (Hinfelaar and 
Simutanyi, 2018). 
Politics is thus an avenue to rents and rewards: business opportunities; government contracts and 
/or jobs; a way of political parties taming their members; buying off political opponents; and / or 
winning supporters. Sources of rents have evolved since the one-party era from copper 
nationalisation during the first republic under Kaunda; privatization of Parastatals and land in the 
second and third republics; and a combination of land and political ‘entrepreneurship’ in the 
current regime. Under the one-party regime, rent distribution was highly centralised. But there 
are indications that the distribution of rents has become decentralised over time, thereby 
increasing rent seeking, much to the benefit of individual political entrepreneurs turned 
‘tenderpreneurs’ (Hinfelaar and Simutanyi, 2018; Levy, 2014). 
This primacy of procurement in rent distribution within the previous and the current political 
establishment and the wider public service is acknowledged and is perceived as increasing. The 
rise in the number and expenditure on public infrastructure projects which the current 
government has embarked on since coming to power in 2011 seems to have contributed to the 
escalation in procurement related malpractices (TIZ, 2018; Zambia; Daily Mail, 2017; Diggers 
20187). 
                                                          
7 Mwenda, J (2018) “Court convicts Brian Chituwo over CDF” Diggers. Aug 31: https://diggers.news/courts/2018/08/31/court-convicts-brian-chituwo-over-cdf/ 
accessed 02.09.18 
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But a political system such as the Zambian one can only remain stable if it is seen to be inclusive 
and the elite consensus against violent political mobilisation remains unshaken. Yet, following the 
tight 2015 presidential bi-election and the 2016 general election, there have been signs that the 
political settlement is cracking, evidenced by increased levels of political violence before and after 
elections and increased tensions between the ruling PF and opposition United Party for National 
Development (UPND), reinforced by ethnic / regional political rhetoric and associated voting 
patterns. 
 
4.3. Part A: Zambia Evolving De Jure System of Public Procurement 
This section looks at Zambia’s evolving de jure system of public procurement, tracing its roots from 
the early 1990s to date. Suffice to mention that the procurement system has benefited from a mix 
of several years of financial and technical support of donors. Though the structure of the dejure 
system has transformed from what it used to be in the early 1990s, it is still work in progress, with 
further amendments to the legislation imminent. 
 
4.3.1. Brief History of Procurement Reforms 
Prior to the reform era, Zambia’s procurement system was like that of many countries, formerly 
colonized by Britain. Small value procurements were centrally done by the Zambia National Tender 
Board (ZNTB) while high value procurements were undertaken by the Central Tender Committee 
(CTC). While the central tender board assured consolidated control on all purchases, it was 
inefficient in that it could not meet the pace of procurement, often resulting in backlog, among 
others. This partly informed the reform agenda that was to follow. 
The early 1990s was reform packed with several of Zambia’s cooperating partners having 
contributed. Support was not always specific to procurement but often within the broader PFM 
framework. Among the donors that supported the reforms are: - i) the World Bank through the 
Financial and Legal Management Upgrading Project (FILMUP);  ii) The Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) provided technical support and training in import management for 
selected public officials including those from ZNTB (World Bank, 1993);8 iii) and In mid 1990s, the 
                                                          
8 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/103431468168565106/text/multi-page.txt 
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World Bank’s Public Sector Capacity Building Project (PSCAP) supported the Office of the Auditor 
General (AoG) in ensuring sound financial management. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline of Procurement Reforms in Zambia
 
Source: own construction based on various information sources 
 
In 1996, GRZ drew a Public Procurement Action Plan, which among others planned to : i) amend 
the ZNTB Act and introduce a Zambia Tender Advisory Council; ii) improve the procurement 
capacity of the Procurement and Supply Units (PSU); iii) delegate authority to PSUs, so that MPSAs 
and Parastatals could carry out own procurement and iv) professionalise and motivate 
procurement cadre. 
Despite the many years of reform effort, there was limited progress to point to (World Bank, OECD, 
2007). The World Bank conducted a Country Procurement Assessment (CPA) in 1997, which 
confirmed challenges in public procurement. With regards to legal reform, it was found that 
though the proposed 1996 Act was revised with broad stakeholder representation and sent to 
Parliament, it was never enacted.  ZNTB was said to be overly focused on its procurement role, 
while neglecting its regulatory role. 
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Following the change of government in 2001, a reform window opened with further reforms 
aimed at escalating the 2000 GRZ’s Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) proposed. The PSRP 
was aimed at improving service delivery. Within the PSRP, there was a lot of continuation of the 
1993 Procurement reforms which had been initiated under the Public Sector Capacity Building 
Project (PSCAP). PSCAP had functioned until 2004 when it was split into the following three (3) 
reform components: i) Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) ii) 
Public Service Management Programme and iii) Decentralisation Programme. 
Some ex-post assessments of the procurement reforms in Zambia allude to “lack of ownership 
from implementers” caused by inadequate inclusion of stakeholders in the planning phase.  
Stakeholders point to lack of capacity explained as (low staffing, poor technical skills, and 
inadequate equipment) and resistance to change among officials as some of the barriers to reform 
(OECD, 2007). 
Consequently, a strategic plan (2002 and 2006) meant to bring changes to the legislation and 
gradual delegation of procurement authority to some PSUs was developed by GRZ, with donor 
support. Backed by international law, there was a call for ZNTB to relinquish its procurement role 
and focus on regulation. Ultimately, ZPPA was formed in 2008. 
 
4.3.2. Procurement Laws and Regulations 
Zambia’s formal system of procurement, drawn from the constitution through to the PPA and the 
procurement guidelines is generally considered to be enough to support the running of a robust 
public procurement system. There are however a few areas of the PPA and the guidelines which 
require enhancing so that they respond to current discourse and practice in the sector. For 
instance, the appeals process / conflict resolution has remained a sticking point.  
 
i) Earlier Reforms 
Earlier regulation was deficient because it did not provide for sanctions and was silent on the 
timeframe for disposing of complaints. The allowable complaints were also limited to those 
between the Tender Committee and the Contractor. Further, the involvement of the Board in 
procurement decisions through the Central Tender Committee (CTC) contradicted with its role of 
conflict resolution. 
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ii) 2008 - Repeal of ZNTB Act 394 
The second-generation reforms occurred in 2008, though preparations and processes 
commenced earlier, under predecessor reform programmes. Three factors seem to have informed 
the changes during this era: i) the need to enhance transparency and accountability and the Zero 
Tolerance to Corruption policy; ii) Government policy to decentralise procurement operations and 
iii) a response to a Common Market for Eastern Southern Africa (COMESA) directive on 
procurement which required member States to reform their procurement legal frameworks in 
order to conform to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement (ZPPA, 2018). 
Following the 2008 reforms, the ZPPA decentralised procurement functions from the centre to 
line MPSAs and began to function as a regulator, responsible for 
“policy, regulation, standard setting, compliance and performance monitoring, professional development 
and information management and dissemination….” (PPA 2008, Part II: 6(1)). 
But ZPPA retained the role of approving procurements conducted through direct bidding – 
through providing “no objections” to the concerned MPSAs. 
But recently, there has been some claw back on the provision of ZPPA approving direct bid, firstly 
through Circular No. 3 of 2017 and the proposed Procurement Amendment Bill of 2017 (discussed 
in the defacto section). 
The 2008 reforms are also credited for developing standard bidding documents and initiating a 
scheme to train a cadre of procurement professionals. A Code of Conduct for procurement 
professionals was put in place. The Code of Conduct aligns with key legislation:  PPA, 2008; ACC 
Act, 2012; the Ministerial and Parliamentary Code of Conduct and the Public Interest Disclosure 
(Protection of Whistle Blowers) Act, 2010 (ZPPA) (ZPPA Website). 
 
iii) Statutory Instrument (SI) No. 63 of 2011 
Close to two years of implementation, the 2008 PPA saw a revision in 2011, through Statutory 
Instrument (SI) No. 63, which elaborated the procurement guidelines. Among others, SI No. 63 
provides for preferential procurement to Zambian citizens. The Citizens’ Economic Empowerment 
Act (CEEC) 2006, divides firms into three categories according to the shareholding, including 
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citizen-influenced (5-25% owned by locals), citizen-empowered (26-50% owned by locals) and 
citizen-owned (50-100% owned by locals)). 
SI No. 53 also provides for the creation of an independent appeals body. The appeals mechanism 
enables bidders who are aggrieved by a procurement process to appeal to the regulator “within 
10 working days of the decision or stage of the procurement proceeding to which it relates….” (No. 
170 and 170) of Procurement Regulations 2011.  The guidelines (No. 167 to 172) also address 
corruption and fraud, providing to sanction or bar a firm or individual bidder who engage in 
fraudulent acts, as defined in Sections 65 to 67 of the 2008 PPA. 
 
iv) New Reform Agenda 
Since 2010 when full implementation of the PPA commenced, some gaps have been identified in 
the Act such as: i) conflict with other pieces of legislation, i.e i) the National Council for 
Construction (NCC) Act; ii) lack of a central body to deal with high value procurements; iii) Weak 
or no provision for e-procurement as a bidding method; iv) a weak appeals process and v) lastly 
but not the least, other pertinent issues which include: a poor focus on value for money; contract 
management and  focus on monitoring procurement through their entire cycle. 
Paradoxically, SI No. 61 (4) of the 2011 guidelines almost runs contrary to the spirit of e-
procurement. It states that 
“…bids shall only be received electronically or by other means which do not permit signed, sealed bids, if 
authorised by the Authority through public procurement circulars.” 
ZPPA recognises the need for resources and attention to be dedicated to pre-market engagement 
and contract management; and focusing on procurement outcomes as means of adding value to 
the procurement process (ZPPA, 2018). However, it is not clear how much of this thinking is 
reflected in the proposed revision of the PPA, whose access has been guarded. 
 
4.3.3. Procurement Organisational Structure 
i) Organisational structure under ZNTB 
The ZNTB Act provided for a Board of twelve (12) members (7 of them ex -officio) all appointed by 
the President. The Act also provided for the establishment of i) Central Tender Committee (CTC) 
within the ZNTB and ii) Tender Committees in Provinces, Ministries, Parastatals and Spending 
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Agencies (MPSAs).  The tender committees had mandate to authorize the procurement of goods 
and services whose cost was below the entity’s financial threshold (OECD, 2003). The CTC met 
once a week to review and approve issues brought before it by the secretariat. Issues of concern 
included: “i) tenders of a value that removed them from the decentralised tender committees’ 
authority; ii) approval of waivers and rules, and iii) approval of variations to approved contracts” 
(World Bank, 2003 P:3). 
There was one key observable tension in the operations of the CTC. While it examined and 
authorized “procurement of goods, works and services in both government and parastatal bodies 
above specified monetary thresholds, it also functioned as a Board”.  The line between the CTC 
and the ZNTB was thus arguably blurred, with some members belonging to both (World Bank, 
ibid).  Further, the CTC and the ZNTB shared the same location and secretariat.  Funding for the 
ZNTB was drawn from an appropriation of funds by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
ii) Organisational Structure under ZPPA 
ZPPA is headed by a Director General (DG), a public service officer who is appointed by the 
President and reports to the board. The Board is chaired by the Minister of Finance (MoF). The 
decentralised set up under the Act allows MPSAs headed by a Controlling Office or Chief Executive 
Officer, to act as Procurement Entities (PEs) within their jurisdiction. An inspectorate unit exists to 
monitor performance of the various public entities (PPA, 2008: Part III (11 -24)). The extent to 
which the unit manages to monitor performance and compliance of PEs is not known. Since 2011, 
ZPPA has seen frequent changes of DGs and senior staff, which could impact negatively on the 
institutional memory and learning. 
A particular disconnect in the structure of procurement in government is the fact that there is no 
single procurement professional official bears the responsibility of procurement 
 
“So, if I am a finance person in any ministry, I report to PS practically, but I report to the accountant general 
professionally. So, if I have a problem with my PS, for instance, who is the chair of the tender committee, 
then I need to tell my accountant general but believe it or not, in procurement, there is no such position. So, 
the procurement personnel in government actually has no father in the procurement process.i” 
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4.3.4. Procurement Processes and Methods 
i) Processes and methods under ZNTB 
The ZNTB Act provided for centralised procurement, using procurement regulations; which were 
supplemented by procurement guidelines through circulars (formal and informal) issued by the 
ZNTB. Circulars were issued for formal tenders in the procurement of goods and services and for 
consultancy services; civil works and informal tenders. 
Procurement planning was more evident in donor funded projects and less in government funded 
programmes. Largely, procurement planning was affected by slow and inconsistent release of 
funds arising from Activity Based Budgeting (ABB) which the government of Zambia used at the 
time. While the Act did not explicitly provide for open competitive bidding, it was practically the 
common method of tendering. There existed a set of guidelines on general conditions for 
contracts and registration of suppliers.  Standard bidding documents were none existent. In some 
instances, World Bank bidding documentation were adapted and utilised, though not in a 
consistent manner. Record keeping was weak in MPSAs. A complaints mechanism existed, even 
though it was deemed as inadequate and almost nonfunctional (World Bank, 2005 and OECD, 
2007). 
ii) Procurement processes and methods under ZPPA 
Part IV of the PPA provides for twelve (12) various procurement methods: open bidding, simplified 
bidding, open bidding, limited bidding, direct bidding, forced account, community participation, 
and use of alternative procurement as methods in public procurement supply.  But the most two 
common methods used by the procurement entities are simplified bidding and open bidding / 
selection. Procurement Entities (PEs) are required to seek prior permission for use of less 
competitive methods of bidding. 
According to the PPA (2008) simplified bidding is reserved for low value procurements of (up to 
K500, 000) off -the shelf purchases. Selection of the supplier is based on at least 3 competitive 
quotations. The open bidding procurement method is used for high value procurements, above 
(the K500, 000) threshold. 
The Act is arguably designed to encourage open bidding as it fosters openness and private sector 
participation.  Openness is to be attained through, invitations for bids and adverts in gazette 
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papers. The newly introduced e-GP is seen as providing opportunity for tenders to be advertised 
on the ZPPA website’s platform. 
The minimum floatation period is (4) four weeks for National tenders and six (6) weeks for 
International tenders.  The minimum procurement cycle for public procurement leading to 
contract award and signature is as follows: minimum – 107 days for National bids and – a minimum 
– 121 days for International bids (ZPPA website). 
Given the barriers that small to medium enterprises face in breaking into markets, governments 
have sometimes focused or aligned economic or commercial reforms to procurement reforms.  
The 2008 Act and guidelines therefore provides for preferential and reserved procurement as 
defined under the Citizens’ Economic Act No. 9 of 2006. It is intended to uplift the targeted citizens 
[emphasis on women and youth, who have suffered economic marginalisation; level the playing 
field and raise citizens to a position where they can effectively participate in the national economy] 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry Website). 
 
4.3.5. Procurement Workforce 
i) Procurement Staff under ZNTB 
During the ZNTB era, there was limited trained or qualified procurement professionals. The civil 
service did not have a clearly defined career path for procurement professionals. The salary 
structure was arguably not matching with the skills and prevailing market conditions. Thus, GRZ’s 
1996 Procurement Action Plan sought to establish an appropriately trained cadre, who would be 
deployed and retained across the civil service to meet the needs of the MPSAs. 
The 1997 CAR found that GRZ showed limited commitment to the project. But with donor support, 
close to 600 persons were trained in the Zambia Management Institute of Management (ZAMIM) 
and Zambia Insurance Business College (ZIBC) between 1998 and 2000. Both ZAMIM and ZBIC 
offered the UK’s Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS) training and qualification. But 
this training only went a limited mile in addressing GRZ’s public procurement human resource 
constraints. For instance, GRZ PEs still had 66 vacant positions and close to half of the 91 people 
employed to undertake procurement work had no procurement training in 1997. Undoubtedly, 
several people that were trained could not be retained within the public service due to 
uncompetitive pay structure and unclear career path (World Bank, 2005 and OECD 2007). 
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ii) Procurement Staff under ZPPA 
The roles and responsibilities of PEs and officials are detailed in the PPA.  Part III 12 (2) of the PPA 
prescribes that only persons qualified in procurement can undertake procurement functions, “in 
accordance with the Zambia Institute of Purchasing and Supply (ZIPS) 2003 Act.” ZIPS is the 
regulatory body on purchasing and supply management profession in Zambia, established through 
an Act of Parliament No.15 of 2003. It was only around 2008 that the training of a professionalized 
cadre seems to have been reorganised. 
 
4.4. Part B: Zambia’s Defacto Public Procurement System without e-GP 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The fact that the legal and regulatory framework anchoring procurement in Zambia is adequate 
cannot be over emphasized. Yet, translating the legal aspects into practical steps that lead to 
positive outcomes seems complex. Like other reforms which Zambia has embarked on, 
implementation of procurement reforms has been particularly slow. Meanwhile, the extent and 
frequency of legal, regulatory or policy revisions that is undertaken in the name of addressing 
perceived procurement challenges at various moments in time is striking. 
 
4.4.2. Formal versus Informal Rules of Procurement 
Zambia’s experience suggests that formal laws, regulations or guidelines seem to serve more the 
function of fulfilling laid down procedures than saving government resources prudently; ticking 
the boxes (Levy, 2014). Though not always manifest, it is the informal rules of the game which take 
precedence in procurement processes (OECD, 2007). The informality is appears carefully couched 
in formal façade. For example, despite all the formal procurement procedures, the immediate past 
minister of Finance recently admitted to the fact that suppliers inflate their prices far beyond 
market values, suggesting possible collusion between government officials and suppliers. 
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“Why should one borehole be paid at K40, 000, while a similar one is paid for at K10, 000 but in the same locality? Why 
should a ream of paper cost so much when supplied to Government but cost less at the market shops “? (Zambia Daily 
Mail).9 
While this example suggests that bureaucrats act alone in flouting government procedures in 
order to get resources for personal gains, the structure of the procurement chain will likely draw 
in other actors, external to government for a suspicious procurement to succeed. 
 
4.4.3. Claw back on procurement legal and /or regulatory provisions 
There have been several instances of government clawing back on legal provisions or agreements, 
not only in procurement but other sectors, whenever personal interests or incentives appear 
threatened. Often, the fine details of the basis of the claw back remain unclear. But speculation 
points to behind the scene lobbying or maneuvers led by those connected to elites in either 
political office or the bureaucracy (Levy, 2014; Hinefelaar and Simutanyi, 2018). 
In addition to the dominance of informal rules over the formal and the general political economy 
of Zambia which impacts on reforms, there are some specific current happenings in the public 
procurement context, which have potential to impact on future reform outcomes or reverse 
progress gained in previous reforms. 
 
i) Rescinding Direct Procurement 
The first scenario is what seems to be an indirect withdrawal of ZPPA’s role in approving direct 
procurement and involvement in governance issues of procurement. This has been done through 
introduction of Circular No. 13 of September 2017, which essentially revises section B (5) of 
Circular No. 1 of 2013. 
Since 2013, PEs had been required to seek a “No Objection” from ZPPA prior to using direct bidding 
as a procurement method. The governance aspect of the circular restricted participation of 
Internal Auditors in procurement evaluation, “so as to strengthen their monitoring role.” However, 
the auditors could take part in the evaluation process as long as they were end users to the goods, 
                                                          
I. 9 Zambia Daily Mail (2017) “Government bleeding through procurement”, 7 Sept: https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/government-
bleeding-through-procurement/ 
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works or services of the procurement in question, as provided for in the procurement guidelines 
No. 64 (4) (b) (ZPPA, 2013). 
Following changes introduced by Circular No. 13 of 2017, there are seven exceptions or 
circumstances in which PEs would not have to seek “No Objection” from ZPPA in order to conduct 
direct bidding:  e.g. service of motor vehicles on warranty or procurement of certain goods and 
services not readily available on the market, such as rentals.  Further, Internal Auditors may now 
be appointed to the evaluation or procurement committees, though not as members of the 
committees but in an advisory capacity to provide the necessary guidance whenever appropriate 
(ZPPA, 2017). 
It appears that the long list of exceptions in circular No 13 grants PEs room to bypass the guidance 
in order to avoid competitive bidding. Beneficiaries of this change are likely to be people with 
interests in the procurement outcomes. 
 
ii) High Value Procurement body coming? 
The second scenario concerns the ongoing revision of the PPA (2008), where one of the proposed 
clauses deals with the creation of a central body to look at high value procurements. Controlling 
officers from key ministries Finance, Health, Education, among others would be part of this body.  
It appears that government’s intent to have high value procurement centralised is an indirect 
reaction to the growing decentralization of rent allocation and distribution by elites, especially 
those with political interests (Hinfelaar and Simutanyi, 2018) as has been discussed in the context 
above. 
 
4.4.4. Possible use of Procurement in Rent Allocation and Distribution 
As earlier stated, the decentralization of public procurement since 2011 (when the 2008 PPA came 
into effect), has enabled the decentralization of rent allocation and distribution among various 
actors. This scenario has potential to contribute to factions or alternative sources of power which 
further has potential to upset the political settlement. 
As an example, recent challenges to the presidential establishment have notably been former 
ruling party stewards, owners of private businesses which at one time or the other could have 
benefited from public procurement contracts but have fallen out of favour with each other. 
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 Below are three cases of three former ruling PF members who had fallen out with each other or 
the President since 2015. They have all been accused of involvement in procurement related 
corruption. 
Box 1 ACC Clears Kabimba and GBM of any Corruption10 
“The ACC) has cleared Justice Minister Wynter Kabimbaii and his defence counterpart Geoffrey Bwalya Mwambaiii. ACC 
said that they have found no evidence of corruption against Justice Minister Wynter Kabimba and his Defence 
counterpart Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, commonly known as GBM. 
ACC had launched preliminary inquiries into corruption allegations against Justice Minister, Wynter Kabimba and his 
Defence counterpart, Geoffrey Mwamba following complaints received on the alleged conduct of the two Cabinet 
ministers. 
Mr Kabimba, who is Patriotic Front (PF) Secretary-General, was alleged to have influenced the procurement tender 
process so that Trafigura would be awarded the tender to supply Zambia with petrol and diesel for one year. 
Trafigura was awarded the supply deal at a cost of US$500 million for the one-year period. 
Mr Mwamba was accused of influencing ZESCO to award his company and others where he had interests, a one-year 
contract for the supply and delivery of wooden poles. 
ZESCO intended to award a tender for the supply and delivery of nine, 10 and 12 metre-wooden poles on a year-
running-contract basis to several bidders, among them Arizona Marketing and Distribution, which belongs to Mr 
Mwamba and two of his family members. Arizona Marketing and Distribution’s bid price on the ZESCO poles contract 
was about K36.7 billion. The company, according to the Patents and Companies Registration Agency (PACRA), was 
owned by Mr Mwamba, of Plot 10 Roan Road in Lusaka’s Kabulonga area. Preliminary notification of the contract 
award for the tender, whose bids were closed and opened on June 8, 2012, indicated that the preliminary award had 
been issued pursuant to Part VI, Section 53 (1) and (2) of the Zambia Public Procurement Act No. 12 of 2008.  
 
 
Box 2 ACC Confirms Probing Kambwili for Corruption11 
In March 2018, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) confirmed placing former Information Minister Chishimba 
Kambwiliiv under investigations. This came a few days after President Edgar Lungu warned that he will fire all Ministers 
engaged in corruption. 
Last week, Lusaka Times exclusively revealed that a highly placed source within the ACC had confirmed that the 
Commission has now started probing Dr Kambwili’s accumulation of vast wealth since he started serving in 
government. 
                                                          
10 https://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/02/20/anti-corruption-commission-clears-kabimba-and-gbm-of-any-corruption/(accessed 17..12.18) 
11 https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/11/14/acc-confirms-probing-kambwili-corruption/ (accessed 15.12.18) 
39 
 
In a statement, ACC Spokesman Timothy Moono said, “Following recent media queries on whether the Anti-Corruption 
Commission is conducting investigations on alleged corrupt practices against Hon. Chishimba Kambwili, former 
Information and Broadcasting Minister, I wish to inform you that there has been an inquiry against Hon. Kambwili on 
allegations of corrupt practices.” Mr. Moono said, “These investigations are on-going, and the Commission would 
therefore not wish to comment further as this may jeopardize the investigations.” 
The source revealed that the subject of the inquiry against Dr Kambwili is the plush villas that the Roan MP has 
constructed on land belonging to Luanshya Golf Club which he has christened Kambwili Estate. The ACC is also 
investigating the construction of around 200 luxury flats near Mitengo area on the Ndola-Luanshya road belonging to 
Dr Kambwili. 
The Commission is also examining how his firm, Mwamona Investments has managed to get several contracts from 
the Road Development Agency, the mining companies and some Councils. 
 
Indeed, many Zambian law makers are business people or aspire to enter business upon ascending 
to political office; often as an avenue to public procurement contracts (Hinfelaar and Simutanyi, 
2018. In addition, political entrepreneurship, driven by access to public contracts, among the 
various key actors from different ethnic groups has been increasing; creating further threats to 
the political settlement.  
While the presidency would historically have control on important rents such as ministerial 
appointments and use them to balance ethnic tensions and factionalism, its strength seems to be 
diminishing, as evidenced by widening polarization based on voting along ethnic lines (Cheeseman, 
Simutanyi and Yezi, 2015). 
 
4.4.5. Chapter Conclusion 
Assessments of the various reform eras paint a mixed picture, with pockets of success in some 
areas and limited progress in others. Reform outcomes reveal gaps between the stated policy 
intentions and practice, while adherence to legal provisions and guidelines has been a challenge. 
For instance, “It was found that despite existence of legal and institutional framework in which 
procurement would take place, ZNTB allowed “undesirable practices and procedures to prevail, as 
opposed to letting rules and laws prevail” (World Bank, 2005). 
Framing and timing of the reform appears to have been primarily anchored on the “Zambian 
government of the day’s effort and willingness to reform”. It is apparent that politics, though 
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difficult to nail down, exists in Zambia’s procurement system and is the precarious binding 
constraint to reform. Because procurement reforms require upsetting vested interests and the 
status quo, political will and action is critical to shifting interests and incentives of various actors 
(OECD, ibid; World Bank, ibid).  Fear of loss of incentives breeds reluctance to transforming 
procurement arrangements, because it would lead to potential loss of rents distribution among 
bureaucrats and political elites.  
Hence, past and current reform efforts which ignore an understanding of the political economic 
context in which the reforms take place risk falling into the isomorphic mimicry category. 
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5. CHAPTER 5  ZAMBIA’S EXPERIENCE OF INTRODUCING THE E-GP 
 
5.1. Introduction to Chapter 
This chapter deals with Zambia’s experience of introducing the e-GP, essentially presenting the 
results of the study. The first section provides the rationale for ZPPA leading the country into the 
direction of e-procurement, and the vision behind it while the second section reflects on MoH’s 
experience as a participant in the e-GP pilot. We specifically take the case of procurement of 
essential drugs and medicines in the MoH to understand how the e-procurement pilot has evolved 
in MoH. 
 
5.2. The State of Zambia’s Public Procurement System 
Public procurement is an important component of Zambia’s economy and is estimated to account 
for 15% of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The goods, services or works which 
government procures range from highly commoditized to highly unique. Accordingly, the task of 
PEs is to ensure that they achieve the most VfM out of suppliers; using the different available 
procurement methods, while ensuring competition (ZPPA, 2018). 
However, ZPPA considers that government through it’s over 500 PEs undertaking procurement on 
its behalf, may not be spending rightly or uniformly on goods, services and works. 
Unfortunately, the sub optimal use of Information Communication Technology (ICT) in PEs 
exacerbates the poor record keeping culture.  Consequently, ZPPA and the PEs have limited readily 
available statistics and information on the cost and value of goods, services and works that are 
procured for government. Lack of robust information and transparency becomes a barrier to 
accountability in the sector (ZPPA, ibid and e-GP documentation).   
Public perception and some documentation also consider government procurement as 
characterized by rampant corruption. Some examples of possible manipulation of the process or 
systems are given in the examples in subsequent paragraphs. 
“The Global Business Anti-Corruption Portal notes that “fraud in the tendering process for government bids 
is widespread and often occurs during vendor selection, contracting and maintenance (GECS 
2014). Transparency and accountability is particularly lacking in the last stages of the procurement process, 
which leaves significant room for manipulation (GI 2017)”.  
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Even supreme organs’ reports such as the Auditor General (OAG) and the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) cast a dark shadow on government procurement, citing it as a sector where wastage 
of public resources is prominent (OAG, 2016; FIC 2018). The 2016 and 2017 FIC reports found 
cases of corruption to be predominantly linked to public procurement contracts and often 
perpetrated by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and their associates. 
Box 3 FIC on Procurement Corruption 
“In 2017 the FIC analysed 624 reports on suspected procurement corruption. Tax evasion cases ranked the highest, 
with an estimated loss of K3.9 billion. Corruption, especially in public procurement, was second with estimated losses 
amounting to around K500 million, while money laundering and fraud were found in third and fourth place, with losses 
amounting to K90.5 million and K3.5 million, respectively. The FIC further notes that “suspected procurement 
corruption mostly occurred in Government and Quasi Government Institutions when the private sector is contracted 
to do works. The attraction to procurement corruption is the large sums involved and the difficulty in detection due to 
collusion and management override. The main methods of procurement corruption are direct bidding and subsequent 
variation of contract sums that take away the value of tendering works. Collusion between PEPs and vendors or 
suppliers; vendors defrauding the corporation; Employees defrauding their employers; bribery, bid-rigging, 
embezzlement, and submission of false claims are the most common schemes” which were noted.  
(FIC, 2018: 12; Zambian Diggers12). 
 
The 2017 OAG documents further cases related to non-compliance with the ZPPA Act and the 
Procurement guidelines in the acquisition of public goods and services. The culture of poor 
compliance seems obvious at both PE headquarters or at district level as the information in the 
box below highlights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 https://diggers.news/local/2018/06/01/zambia-lost-k4-5bn-to-financial-crimes-in-2017-fic/ (Accessed on 28.11.18) 
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Box 4  OAG on Procurement related Corruption 
 
Mwandi District Health Office (DHO) - MoH   
Contrary to Public Procurement Regulations No. 119 (3), which requires that there is authority of the Public 
Procurement Committee for procurements above the authorised threshold or single sourced, there was no approval of 
the Procurement Committee for procurements of various goods and services valued at K52,861 procured at Mwandi 
DHO), (AoG, 2018: 85). 
 
 Procurement of an Ambulance – Ministry of Defence, (MoD)  
On 26th September 2017, the Zambia Army entered into a contract with Razz Exports of South Africa for the supply 
and delivery of an ambulance at a contract price of K952, 0181 (R1,356,538) with a delivery period of six (6) to eight 
(8) weeks. The terms of payment were that the advance payment of 25% of contract price shall be paid within thirty 
(30) days of signing the contract against a receipt of a bank guarantee for the equivalent amount, 50% to be paid 
within sixty (60) days on receipt of the Goods and upon submission of the documents, while the 25% balance to be paid 
within sixty (60) days after the date of the acceptance certificate for the respective delivery issued by the Zambia Army. 
On 9th October 2017, the contractor was paid the advance payment of K238, 005. However, as at 31st July 2018, the 
ambulance had not been delivered. In his response dated 17th August 2018, the Controlling Officer stated that the 
supplier had delivered an ambulance with wrong specifications which was rejected and sent back, and that the supplier 
had been given up  to end of June 2018 to deliver the ambulance.  
However, as at 31st August 2018, the ambulance had not been delivered, (OAG, 2018: 121). 
There have been complaints and concerns at the slow pace the investigative wings have been 
taking to act on the OAG reports among others. In a bid to address issues arising from audits 
expeditiously, the OAG has entered into Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) the following 
investigative wings in the recent past: -  
i) With the ACC (2012), aimed at sharing information related to corruption earlier than the 
release of the OAG’s report; 13 
ii) With the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) and FIC in 2015, aimed at “sharing 
information that requires further investigation and prosecution by the law enforcement 
                                                          
13 http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2012/06/16/acc-auditor-generals-office-sign-mou/ (Accessed on 18.12.18) 
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agencies and assisting both institutions conduct performance audits and forensic 
investigations”.14 
 
iii) Further, the ACC entered into a “MoU with ZPPA aimed at sharing information in the management 
of irregularities that may occur in public procurement in 2016. It also aims at improving compliance 
to the PPA and enhance transparency and accountability in public procurement15.  Below are 
examples of cases that have been picked up by the ACC as a result of such MoU arrangements: - 
 
Box 5  ACC on Procurement Related Corruption 
Possible interference with Information System – Ministry of Lands 
“The Commission has also been investigating cases of suspected fraud and corruption at the Ministry of Lands involving 
officials of a company contracted by the Ministry to design and develop a Land Management Database. Investigations 
have been concluded and have revealed glaring tampering and altering of information on the system. The Commission 
will soon be taking the next course of action.” 
 
Certification and payment for works not delivered  
“Investigations into the certification for payment on unexecuted works by a named officer in the Buildings Department 
at the Ministry of Works and Supply. This is a matter where a contractor was engaged to construct a health centre, 
staff house, and three pit latrines in Solwezi. The funds were paid following the certification, but the works were not 
done. Investigations are ongoing and have reached an advanced stage16”. 
 
Politicians and citizens of reputable status have also been alleged to interfere in procurement 
processes. Recently, a tribunal constituted to investigate former Tourism and Arts Minister Sylvia 
Masebo over allegations of abuse of office and breaching the State Security Act heard that 
 
 “…the Minister (Masebo) was wrong to have cancelled the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) 19 Safari 
hunting concession tenders and that the only authorities with the powers to cancel a running tender were 
the chief executive officer of an institution or the tender committee, and not the president or his Ministers17.” 
                                                          
14  http://www.lusakavoice.com/2015/01/22/auditor-general-dec-and-fic-sign-mou/ (accessed on 18.12.18) 
15 https://www.lusakatimes.com/2017/01/16/acc-institutes-investigation-alleged-corruption-zambia-malawi-maize-deal/ (Accessed 29.11.18) 
16 https://www.pressreader.com/zambia/zambian-business-times/20171211/281831464075965 (Accessed on 28.11.18) 
17 ”Sata, Masebo had no power to cancel ZAWA tender-ZPPA” Daily Nation https://www.zambiadailynation.com/2014/03/11/sata-masebo-had-
no-power-to-cancel-zawa-tender-zppa/ (Accessed 28.11.18) 
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In a submission after being subpoenaed by the Judge Royda Kaoma Tribunal, former ZPPA Director 
for Inspection and Standards, Gloria Ngoma further testified that  
“ZPPA had objected to the application by ZAWA to include chiefs in the evaluation process after it 
had already commenced because the action would have jeopardized the transparency of the 
process”.  She explained that the  
“…evaluation of tender process was a discreet and confidential process and that any attempt to include new 
members after the evaluation process had commenced could seriously injure and compromise the 
process18”. 
 
5.2.1. Procurement Rigging and Business Cartels 
In attempting to give a sense of what might or might not go wrong in public procurement in 
Zambia, we present a case of fertiliser procurement under the Farmer Input Support Programme 
(FISP). This is perhaps one of the cases widely available in the public domain. The case provides 
information which could border on: - meddling with documentation; lack of transparency; 
business cartels; non responsive bids and a test of how the appeals process or oversight 
institutions function among others (Roberts, S and Vilakhazi, T (?); Times of Zambia19 and20; Lusaka 
Times21) 
 
Background 
Prior to 2013, the Zambian fertilizer market had been historically dominated by Omnia and 
Nyiombo. The two companies had collective shares estimated to be around 70 - 80% in fertilizer 
market of roughly 540 000 tons (ibid) and were mainly active between 2007 and 2011. However, 
after 2013, the fertilizer market started witnessing the coming in of other players such as ETG and 
Greenbelt; by which time Nyiombo and Omnia had clearly started losing substantial share of the 
market (Roberts, S and Vilakhazi, T (?)). 
                                                          
18 ”Sata, Masebo had no power to cancel ZAWA tender-ZPPA” Daily Nation https://www.zambiadailynation.com/2014/03/11/sata-masebo-had-
no-power-to-cancel-zawa-tender-zppa/ (Accessed 28.11.18) 
19 “Fertiliser case withdrawn” Times of Zambia August 23rd December 2012. https://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2012/08/23/fertiliser-case-
withdrawn/ (accessed on 04.12.18) 
20 “Omnia, Nyiombo fined over $20m cartel” Times of Zambia.  http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2013/06/06/omnia-nyiombo-fined-over-20m-
cartel/ (Accessed on 4.12.18) 
21 “Firm cites corruption in fertiliser deal, seeks judicial review in court” https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/08/20/firm-cites-corruption-
fertiliser-deal-seeks-judicial-review-court/ (Accessed 04.112.18) 
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 This may also be linked to the end of the cartel arrangements between Omnia and Nyiombo, which were 
found by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Zambia (CCPC) to have rigged government 
contracts for fertilizer supply between 2007 and 2011 (Roberts and Vilakazi, ibid). 
 Box 6 The Judiciary and the Competition Commission on Procurement Rigging and Business Cartels 
 
August 12, 2012, quoting Muvi TV, the Lusaka Times (ibid) reported that: - 
 
“One of the bidders in the supply and delivery of fertilizer for the year 2012 to 2013 farming session has 
cited corruption in the awarding of the tender to Nyiombo investment. Neria’s Investment Limited has since 
filed for judicial review of government’s move to award the tender to Nyiombo investment amid an appeal 
it has lodged before the ZPPA. In an affidavit filed in the Lusaka High Court, Neria’s investment claims the 
move by Agriculture Minister, Emmanuel Chenda, to announce the awarding of the contract to Nyiombo 
investment before the ZPPA could resolve its appeal, is illegal and in contravention of section 70 (4) of the 
ZPPA act. The company has cited the issuance of a certificate of registration to Nyiombo investment by the -
CEEC- on May 17 2012 as one irregularity adding that this was done after submission of bids was closed. 
Submission of bids was closed on April 29 2012 (Muvi TV22). 
 
 
On 23rd August 2012, the Times of Zambia reported that the “Fertiliser Case was withdrawn, 
following a successful meeting held by the two parties.” 
 
Fertiliser Case Withdrawn 
“THE Lusaka High Court has allowed the withdrawal of the case in which Neria’s Investment dragged the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to court for allegedly awarding contracts to two firms illegally. Neria 
had also included ZPPA) and the Attorney General in the court case. Ms Justice Phiri also granted a consent 
order to the parties that no award of contracts for the supply and delivery of fertiliser on the Copperbelt and 
Central provinces, known as Zone One and Two would be done until the matter of the appeal was 
determined. Neria’s Investment Ltd. had contended that the court should quash the decision to announce 
                                                          
22 “Firm cites corruption in fertiliser deal, seeks judicial review in court” https://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/08/20/firm-cites-corruption-
fertiliser-deal-seeks-judicial-review-court/ (Accessed 04.112.18) 
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the successful bidders before addressing the applicants appeal over irregularities surrounding the whole 
process. 
In their consent order delivered yesterday in chambers, the parties agreed that ZPPA should proceed to 
determine the applicant’s appeal as provided for under part 7 of the Public Procurement Act Number 12 of 
2008. They also agreed that Neria’s application be determined within seven days. The applicant was also 
seeking an order of mandamus to compel the respondents to consider the provisions of the Citizens Economic 
Empowerment Commission (CEEC) Act in the awarding of contracts to supply and deliver fertiliser that were 
clear and straight-forward. The company sought another order to declare that the process of evaluation by 
the Central Tender Committee was unreasonable by virtue of the respondents’ failure to adhere to law 
(Times of Zambia (ibid). 
 
Later in 2013, the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (CCPC) “fined Omnia 
Fertiliser Zambia and Nyiombo Investments Ltd five percent each of their respective annual 
turnovers for engaging in a cartel worth more than US$20million.23”  
A record of adjudication of the CCPC board observed that: - 
•  “Both Nyiombo and Omnia had entered into an anti-competitive agreement aimed at dividing the 
market for the supply of fertiliser under the FISP to their advantage. 
• The agreement entered into by the two firms showed that they had collaborated in the distribution and 
supply of fertiliser in Zambia and that the primary objective was for each company to focus on supplying 
and distributing fertiliser in the allocated zones where it has sustainable competitive advantage; 
• The trend had been that wherever one party tendered, the other made sure that only one of them won; 
• The two companies were exchanging information relating to the prices of fertiliser; 
• Nyiombo and Omnia were also engaged in bid rigging during the tendering for fertiliser under FISP” 
Times of Zambia)24.   
 
                                                          
23 “Omnia, Nyiombo fined over $20m cartel” Times of Zambia.  http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2013/06/06/omnia-nyiombo-fined-over-20m-
cartel/ (Accessed on 4.12.18) 
24 http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2012/08/23/fertiliser-case-withdrawn/ (accessed on 04.12.18) 
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Omnia and Nyiombo had in “recent years also been linked to allegations of fraudulent relations 
with the government agents that are in charge of facilitating the tender process in the ZPPA and 
Ministry of Agriculture25 in (Roberts and Vilakazi (ibid)). 
The Neria Case clearly shows that there is a myriad of issues which border on VfM and / or 
transparency that the e-GP could help resolving if put in place. Yet, in the absence of 
benchmarking; and proper record keeping, and cooperation from PEs, ZPPA is unable to offer 
specific evidence-based advice to the PEs on the right cost or general VfM components of 
procurement. 
 
5.3. The State of Procurement in MoH 
The MoH is one of the largest spending PEs in Zambia. MoH’s biggest expenditure lines are 
infrastructure, essential drugs and medical supplies. For the year 2018, the Minister of Finance 
has announced an expenditure of K6.8 billion on health. Of this amount, K1.2 billion is for 
procurement of essential drugs and medical supplies representing a 56 percent increase over the 
2017 allocation. 
Like all public procurements, the procurement of essential medicines and medical supplies funded 
by the government of Zambia is guided by the PPA of 2008. The Procurement and Supply Unit 
(PSU), under the Human Resources Department of MoH leads the procurement process. The PSU 
reports directly to the Permanent Secretary (PS) – Administration. 
The NSCS and Implementation Plan for Essential Medicines and Medical Supplies (2015 -2017) 
designate Medical Stores Limited (MSL) as the lead entity for procurement. Established in 1976 
under the Companies Act, MSL’s original mandate was to carry out procurement, storage and 
distribution of all essential drugs for Zambia’s public health sector. This mandate changed in 1996 
when the procurement function was re-located to the MoH, as part of general government reform 
to locate procurement functions in respective line ministries. For two decades, MSL was thus 
responsible for drug storage and distribution and not procurement and quantification. 
                                                          
25  (in ‘Government broadens FISP tender process' (18 April 2012), at: http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=26958; and 
‘Corruption deal backfires’ (18December 2013), at:  http://zambiadailynation.com/2013/12/18/corruption-deal-backfires/; and ‘PAC questions 
govt over Nyiombo Investments, Omnia’s contracts’ (25 March 2010), at: http://www.postzambia.com/Joomla/post-
read_article.php?articleId=7395). 
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But this mandate changed in 2012, following a directive by the then late former Minister of Health, 
Dr. Joseph Kasonde, to transfer back the procurement and supply chain management to MSL from 
MoH. However, the process of actualising this transfer of function between the two entities is only 
on paper and has not been realized. Several explanations are offered by stakeholders for the 
limited traction on this matter: - budget control by MoH; inadequate staffing; etc. 
But of all the reasons cited, the issue of interests and incentives in procurement, which we address 
later in this chapter, appear significant for the purpose of this study. 
If undertaken, the transfer of procurement function from MoH to MSL is considered as one which 
would minimize MoH’s heavy hand in procurement; increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the 
chain through eliminating an extra layer of bureaucracy. 
With regards to procurement systems, the general sense is that the formal systems available in 
the MoH, backed by all the national legal frameworks and guidelines are adequate (EU, 2015). 
However, it is the implementation or sometimes interpretation of systems that appear to go 
wrong. Corruption and leakages in procurement, amidst all the adequate guidelines and 
procedures is an example of what goes wrong. For instance, the MoH recorded a damning 
procurement related corruption case in 2008, which suggest that those involved have discovered 
ways of by-passing the formal system. A decade after it was uncovered, this particular case of 
(Henry Kapoko versus the people) is still alive in the Zambian courts. This case continues to 
highlight elusive spots in the practice of procurement. The allegations, arrests and until recently 
some successful convictions clearly demonstrate that there could be individuals or networks, 
within and outside PEs, acting together to circumvent the formal procurement system. 
In summary, heavy handedness of the MoH in selection, quantification and procurement; expiries 
and drug stock- outs; increasing drug debt; leakages across national borders; corruption; and 
weaknesses in the storage and distribution are the major issues linked to procurement in the 
public health supply chain, which stakeholders are grappling with. 
Subsequently, Government and its cooperating partners have continued searching and investing 
in policy, human and financial solutions aimed at resolving limitations in the medical supply chain 
while attempting to attain VfM. As stated above, the e-GP is the latest of the solutions that 
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government and CPs are attempting to resolve some well documented bottlenecks in the medical 
supply chain. 
 
5.4. The Promise of the e-GP 
In view of the challenges alluded to in the foregoing, ZPPA considers the e-GP pilot as a potential 
avenue to gather information that would inform a procurement baseline; enhance record keeping 
and generate data that contributes to efficiency, transparency and accountability in public 
procurement. It would aid streamlining procurement processes and tightening controls on 
spending through introduction of Information Technology (IT) in the procurement system, via a 
web-based procurement portal, e-bidding, e-purchasing, and e-Contract management (ZPPA 
Website). The fact that the e-GP would reduce human integration in procurement processes and 
procedures is seen as a strength of the system. 
 
Below are some of what ZPPA considers as challenges which the e-GP could address and envisaged 
benefits: - 
 
5.5. MoH’s early experience of Procurement using the E-GP 
Informed by primary interviews with various stakeholders in procurement and secondary 
information from project documentation, this section reflects on the experience of MoH in 
implementing the e-GP. 
How does e-GP Solve Existing Challenges 
• Eliminates some manual processes for example tendering, bidding and notification, which may be 
undertaken electronically 
• Centralized storage of bidding information and thus reduces paper usage and movement 
• Eliminates or reduces costly vendor visits to the procuring entities 
• the reduction in the paper usage reduces environmental degradation 
• Geographical boundaries are eliminated 
Benefits of e-GP 
• Reduces cost to bidders 
• Greater transparency through the automated publication of Tenders and Contract awards 
• Makes it easier to monitor compliance 
• Allows integration with other stakeholders’ systems 
• Easier management of framework agreements 
• Easy generation and sharing of management reports 
• Simplifies the publication of information to Bidders, Suppliers and the general public 
Source: ZPPA Website 
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5.5.1. Procurement Planning 
In its regulatory capacity, ZPPA monitors how well PEs are spending through their Procurement 
Plans. The PPA, Section 42 (2), requires PEs to prepare Annual Procurement plans and to submit 
these to ZPPA. Until 2016 when the e-GP pilot was introduced, ZPPA and all the PEs have been 
submitting manual plans to ZPPA. But since the introduction of e-GP in 2016, procurement plans 
from MPSAs are published online. However, ZPPA indicates that not all PEs have been consistent 
in submitting their plansv.  In fact, “only 70% of PEs submit their Annual Procurement Plans (which 
are used for reviews and approval)”. While quarterly procurement reports are reviewed and 
feedback given to PEs, this is not processed because there is no database and information exists 
only in manual form (Crown Agents, 2018:14). Thus, ZPPA does not hold comprehensive 
information about the goods, services or works that PEs plan to procure or have procured and 
whether these represent VfM. 
But there are also other issues related to procurement, which arise at various levels of the 
procurement cycle, which e-GP is envisaged to address: - 
 
a) Record Keeping 
Record keeping and space limitation has been a challenge for PEs since the era of ZNTB, which has 
continued under the ZPPA era. This issue has been emphasised by staff in PEs and ZPPA, and well 
documented in several procurement projects’ life spans (World Bank, 2002; 2005 and OECD 2007). 
The challenge of record keeping, and document storage gets deep and complicated at the level of 
PEs, because this is where all procurement information is generated, and is ultimately stored. 
 
b) Collusion 
Manual procurement, especially in a context of eroded trust and embedded interests and 
incentives arguably predisposes the system to perception of manipulation. It is a widely held 
perception that those with interests in a procurement tamper with the paper documentation, 
possibly destroying paper trail.  While similar manipulation is possible in an electronic system, the 
view is that it is harder to breakthrough in an electronic system than it is to discard paper. Thus, 
the e-GP is seen as enhancing stakeholder confidence in the process. Bidders who have interacted 
with the e-GP were said to have expressed confidence in it, with respect to document securityvi. 
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Document security seems to be the one point that all stakeholders are agreed on, as the main 
rationale for introducing the e-GP. The acceptance level of the e-GP regarding this point seems 
high. 
 
c) Transparency 
PEs have often been found not to practice enough transparency in procurement processes. For 
instance, information about the winning bidders is seldom published by MoH (EU, 2015). The e-
GP is designed to send automatic responses to bidders participating in tenders, regardless of 
whether they qualify or not. In its full functionality, the e-GP would enable PEs manage contracts 
electronically, a function which would enhance transparency in the process (ZPPA website).  
In summary, interviews and documentation suggested that due to the perception of reduced 
human interaction in the procurement processes and procedures, the e-GP has generated some 
levels of confidence among stakeholders. Where it has been consistently used such as ZPPA, the 
e-GP was said to have reduced cost of running tendersvii. 
 
5.5.2. Problem Definition: objective setting on the e-GP 
The main objectives of the overall procurement reforms are articulated in the World Bank’s Project 
Appraisal of 2014 as (i) “to establish and strengthen ZPPA’s oversight and regulatory role in public procurement 
and ii) to strengthen ZIPS’s capacity to establish and maintain quality standards of purchasing and supply 
professionals” (World Bank, 2014: 16). 
 
a) No e-GP Specific Concept Note? 
Beyond the project definition set out in the World Bank’s Appraisal mentioned above, this study 
was unable to get hold of specific documentation which serves as a concept note on the e-GP; or 
an articulation of what success of the e-GP could look like in pilot PEs such as the MoH. The World 
Bank (ibid: 18), introduces the IT sub component of the procurement reform, as one which could 
be carried out in a phased approach to improve transparency and efficiency. According to this 
documentation “the e-government procurement development package will include the data center, back-up power 
arrangement, and user training. Under the scope of the program, the system will be piloted on a limited scale in 
selected agencies. 
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In separate interviews, two respondents close to the project (ZPPA and MoH) could not recall 
having come across an e-GP specific concept note. In one PE, the respondent indicated that “ZPPA 
had requested them to implement the e-GP and then go back and tell them [ZPPA] the problems that they 
would encounter [so that ZPPA could resolve them]viii. It appears that implementation of the e-GP 
started without due reflection of what or how the e-procurement system could offer in the 
Zambian context. 
An interrogation of the e-GP model (fig 1) provides a sense of how the e-GP should ideally function. 
An immediate observation from this model is the conceptual assumption that stakeholders would 
garner around the technology and not necessarily around commonly defined problems. Thus, 
from the project’s early days, it is observed that the extent to which the implementers of the e-
GP have focused on the non-technical fixes to the procurement challenges remains questionable. 
 
Figure 2 The e-GP System 
 
Source: https://www.zppa.org.zm/ 
Documentation and interviews reviewed as part of the study do not seem to provide a sense of 
the priorities which the PEs participating in the e-GP pilot are focusing on. Specifically, there is no 
information explaining the rationale for the selection of MoH as a participant in the pilot. Save for 
scanty information in progress reports and interviews, referring to the MoH as a high-income 
spender; and that it attracts numerous procurement appeals from suppliers (DFID, 2017). 
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In the absence of a road map of implementation and convincing definition of the problem being 
addressed, both ZPPA and MPSA’s readiness for such a massive transformation in the manner of 
conducting business becomes questionable. For PEs such as MoH, the question of ownership of 
the project starts to emerge. 
 
b) Traces of ownership 
While we generally question the extent to which MoH procurement staff had bought into the 
overall goal of the e-GP, we identified two aspects in their narrative, which seemed to suggest that 
they believed in some of the benefits which the e-GP could potentially offer. 
 
• That the e-GP could address challenges of records storage and security 
Ease of record keeping and security was the number one benefit that public procurement officers 
cited as a benefit of the e-GP. In Zambia, procurement record keeping is mandatory by law, were 
Section 38 of the PPA requires PEs to maintain records of all procurement proceedings for a period 
of seven years. But the bulkiness of the documents constrains PEs to fulfil this obligation. Further, 
procurement staff mentioned that the e-GP serves as a shield from negative perception from 
bidders that they are responsible for manipulation of procurement documents; in essence 
excluding certain bidders from qualifying for tenders: - “Suppliers will generally feel safe that their 
bid is intact when submitted online unlike when they submit it manuallyix.”  
Indeed, everyday public discourse is rich with cases of individuals interfering with public 
procurement processes or documentation. However, through this study, we have partly learnt 
that these cases appear not to be systematically documented across all PEs.  Moreover, the fear 
to give out information to non-public servants meant that obtaining a specific case on health-
related procurement was daunting.  Public servants were happy to refer to cases which have been 
publicly reported and not those they referred to as ‘under investigation’ or sensitive. Thus, the 
Fertiliser Case (in section 5.1.1) and the case of Sylvia Masebo cancelling tender in 5.1.1 provides 
the closest insights to what meddling in public procurement processes or tampering with 
documentation could look like.  
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Regrettably, even the institutions which are mandated to investigate such matters (i.e ACC, Drug 
Enforcement Commission (DEC) and or Zambia Police) have also been cited as losing 
documentation pertaining to some cases.  This is one of the reasons given as the basis for delays 
in investigations or disposing of cases.  
 
• That the e-GP could potentially help them to manage the appeals processes 
The assumption is that with technology, there would be a trail of the procurement transaction(s) 
documentation from the advert through to the award of the contract. 
While some procurement staff fed into the study, they did not generally appear close to 
information on the project. They for example made constant reference to the former Head of 
Procurement as the person who ‘knew a lot about the project.’ 
Lack of ownership seems detrimental to the e-GP landing in MoH, where procurement staff seem 
to already work in silos, probably a consequence of how project support has been historically 
designed and configured. There is for example staff specifically attached to procurement related 
aspects of donor procurements (i.e World Bank and SIDA). 
Given the observations around problem definition and ownership, this study is inclined to 
conclude that the e-GP had been wholesaled as a solution to MPSA’s procurement challenges, 
without due consideration of the problems it is aimed to address and why they matter. It is also 
probable that MoH, and other MPSAs could have joined the pilot to fulfil the obligation to the 
regulator. 
 
5.6. The pre e-GP launch period 
a) Circular No 1 of 2016 
On 1st September 2016, ZPPA issued Circular No. 1 of 2016 titled “Introduction of the Electronic 
Government Procurement System”,26 addressed to Controlling Officers, Chief Executives and Town 
Clerks in MPSAs, including the Local Authorities (Annexed). The content of the circular suggest that 
                                                          
26 https://www.zppa.org.zm/documents/20182/35763/CIRCULAR_1_OF_2016_INTRODUCTION+OF+THE+ELECTRONIC+GOVERNMENT+PROCUREMENT+SYSTEM/ed4f16a6-5cc9-4fc4-a1f6-
fe2b7fc76d84?version=1.1 (accessed 06.08.18) 
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it should have reached the MPSAs prior to the e-GP launch. Ironically, the circular was only sent 
to PEs two months after the e-GP launch. 
Content wise, the circular is pitched at two levels: - i) information (need to know); and ii) a 
combination of advice and action. 
 
Three headlines can be picked around the information aspect of Circular No. 1: - 
i) Communicated the e-GP and the MPSAs which were part of the pilot; 
ii) Communicated the sensitisation which ZPPA would be conducting and 
iii) Informed about ZPPA’s move to register suppliers on the system. 
 
The advice and action aspect of the circular called on MPSAs to prepare IT infrastructure in 
readiness for the e-GP introduction. But the action dimension of the circular is rather understated 
for the sort of action that MPSAs were being requested to execute. Moreover, compliance to this 
action could have budgetary implications for the MPSAs and their compliance with the action 
aspect of the circular was likely to be dependent on whether they had accepted the project and 
their financial ability. 
 
c) No supporting IT Infrastructure 
Because the e-GP had no budget set aside to provide IT infrastructure, staff in the pilot PEs 
described it as not being ‘ready’ for roll out. Insignificant as provision of IT infrastructure might 
seem, it is likely that it impacted on PE’s commitment and enthusiasm for uptake of the e-GP. Non 
provision of IT equipment by the project sponsors was argued as being at odds with the general 
practice in ‘funded projectsx.’ If the equipment had been provided, it could have been assigned to 
“the project.” 
By implication, the MPSAs could have selected staff to be designated to the e-GP; with possibility 
of those staff drawing an allowance and / or entitled to extra remuneration over and above their 
government salary. 
With regards to the IT hardware, procurement staff in MoH indicated having access to IT 
equipment and connectivity. However, they did not manage to use it fully because they were 
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constrained by slow internet connection. A further limitation cited was on access to functional 
computers and internet, especially for members of the procurement committees external to MoH. 
As earlier stated, it appears that at project design, there was an explicit assumption that members 
of evaluation committees would always have access to computers and internet connectivity, when 
the reality proved not. 
 
d) Internal resources versus outsourcing 
The e-GP has been internally driven by a group of staff drawn from within ZPPA (included Capacity 
Building and Information Technology (IT)). This is the core team which has been conducting 
sensitisation sessions to the public and trainings for procurement staff in PEs. It was learnt that 
the previous DG had insisted on having the e-GP process being led by ZPPA staff as opposed to 
outsourcingxi. The in-house approach was perceived as an effective way of ensuring that 
knowledge and skill was generated and resided within the ZPPA. The DG was said to have been 
against the initial plan of engaging a marketing firm to undertake capacity development and 
popularizing the e-GP to PEs. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of having an in-house cohort of experts to support the e-GP, 
stakeholders from PEs and external users, raised concerns; particularly around the ZPPA’s 
turnaround time of their IT queries. Part of the reason for the delays in responding to IT specific 
challenges could be that ZPPA has no rights to the commercial software on which the e-GP runs. 
ZPPA often relies on remote support from the contractor, while its local users expect a robust 
process of trouble shooting. 
 
5.6.1. Confronting Politics and Managing Change 
As earlier stated, public procurement appears to attract significant interest among various actors, 
possibly because of the intrinsic incentives. It is emerging that public procurement provides a 
seemingly soft avenue for various players to exploit and extract government resources and 
channel them towards rewarding their political loyalists, among others. Conversations with 
stakeholders as part of this study, augmented by analyses of Zambia’s political economy (Levy, 
2014; Cheesman, Simutanyi and Yezi, 2015 and Hinfelaar and Simutanyi, 2018) provide the 
58 
 
evidence of this assertion.  While the negative public spotlight and perception centers on 
politicians, there is evidence to show that mismanagement and misapplication of state resources 
is increasing and extends to the lowest bureaucrat in the hierarchy of the procurement; as 
discussed in the ensuing paragraphs: - 
 
a) Politicians 
“You should know by now as a Zambian that there is power to control.  Procurement - there is big money in 
it.xii” 
 
Patronage and corresponding rents, as explained above is the lens we utilise to help unpack the 
trends in Zambian political economy context. An understanding of how the patronage network is 
cultivated and structured is critical. For instance, an understanding of the governance 
arrangements and how that is exercised within ZPPA in relation to the overall political economic 
context; and the limitations therein perhaps provides some useful starting point for the 
interrogation of the big picture issues in Zambia’s public procurement, and how that possibly 
impacts PEs. 
The Minister of Finance is the Chairperson of the Board of ZPPA. Despite the powers that the 
minister should lead colleagues and the country into transforming procurement, we learnt from 
interviews that successive ministers of finance appear laid back on the reform agenda. The trend 
of quietness over reforms exists at the wider Cabinet level. This position is confirmed by more 
recent similar analysis (Crown Agents, 2018). 
The muteness though, among politicians was said to have been more on the electronic 
procurement agenda, and less on other proposed procurement reforms. For instance, it was learnt 
that recently, politicians in government had been insistent on two reform areas of the PPA, 
suggestive of them having underlying interests in the matters: - 
i) the re-introduction of a Central Tender Committee (CTC) (to oversee high value 
procurement involving all PEs); and 
ii) the need for PEs to be allowed to undertake direct bidding without ZPPA’s approval. 
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These proposals have been incorporated in the proposed PPA Amendment Bill of 2017 (unofficial 
version). 
Due to the perceived interests in procurement, the speculation is that a sitting finance minister 
would be reluctant to publicly champion reforms for fear of being perceived as inhibiting 
colleagues within cabinet or the ruling party structures from benefitting. Moreover, in the current 
political dispensation, where the line between the party and government appears blurred, the 
space for reform for the finance minister appears restrictive. Based on the foregoing, Zambian 
politicians’ commitment to seeing the e-GP succeed is questionable. 
 
b) Bureaucrats 
What can ZPPA realistically push and what can it not? 
 
Legally, ZPPA has sanctioning power as a regulator. However, several stakeholders perceive it as 
unable to assert and utilise its power where and when it matters most. “ZPPA is a big dog which 
cannot bite.xiii” For instance, the PPA, Section 42 (2) requires PEs to prepare annual procurement 
plans and to submit these to ZPPA for online publication. The plans are also subject to continuous 
revision. But the implementation or compliance to this provision already appears inconsistent. For 
example, MoH was cited as one PE which is often late in submitting its annual procurement plans 
while ZPPA was said not to have sanctioned any PE due to untimely delivery of procurement plans, 
as alluded to in 4.3.1. 
Across the board, respondents lamented what they termed as the shrinking space between ruling 
party politics and the public service. This study learnt that the work environment within ZPPA and 
in MPSAs has been evolving negatively in the past few years, characterised with fear; especially 
that of losing employment, being transferred or retired in ‘national interest’. Procurement 
professionals were said to be among the most affected by these dynamics, which are arguably 
instigated by politicians and their loyalists but implemented by senior bureaucrats such as 
controlling officers. Staff movements in both ZPPA and MoH was said to contribute to loss of 
institutional memory. 
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During interviews, we noted a trend were procurement staff seemed to withhold information; 
were often unable to share documentation and opted for anonymity, due to what they termed as 
fear of reprisal. Part of the restraint by public servants to provide information possibly arises from 
a directive issued by Cabinet / the President in June 2018 against “unmandated government officials 
from issuing public statements on economic and financial matters, including on debt contraction. Such 
statements will now be done by the minister of finance.27 The respondents were also upfront about 
their fears and the limitations which the political environment placed on their work and impeded 
ability to make decisions in some cases. 
While appreciating the potential benefits of the e-GP such as averting possible ‘fixing’ or collusion 
in procurement, procurement staff consider the e-GP as a double-edged sword; to an extent that 
it places them under the spotlight of various interested parties. Of all the interested parties in 
procurement, procurement staff seemed guarded of politics peddled by ruling party functionaries 
or those they referred to as being ‘connected’ to ruling party heavy weights. For example, both 
within and outside MoH, the speculation by respondents was that the ‘retiring in national interest’ 
of the former head of procurement at MoH in early 2017 had been triggered by the non - 
responsive bids on one of the procurements conducted through the e-GP. 
 
Box 7 below summarizes recent happenings in the public procurements sector and in MoH, which 
are perceived as contributing to procurement staff anxiety and restraint referred to in previous 
paragraphs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 https://www.lusakatimes.com/2018/06/15/no-more-loans-orders-president-lungu-as-he-bans-travel-and-suspends-financing-of-unfinished-
projects/ (Accessed on 18.12.18) 
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Box 7:  What has Changed in the Procurement Environment? 
Within the year 2017, ZPPA lost two key individuals (the DG and the Director, Monitoring and compliance) who were 
considered as e-GP champions. While the reasons for the two’s separation from the authority could be different, 
respondents speculated that the former’s eagerness to reform the way procurement is conducted, through the e-GP 
among others, perhaps unsettled some interests of powerful people; costing them their jobs. 
The DG did not have his contract renewed in 2016, upon expiry, while the Director for Monitoring and Compliance 
was said to have been fired before her contract expired. The DG was replaced with another former DG, who had 
served in the organisation during the transition from ZNTB to ZPPA through to President Sata’s term. He was fired by 
President Sata in 2014, over what media reports alleged was a result of “growing controversies about how telecom 
tenders have been awarded to Chinese companies.” 28  
But we also learnt about how politicians had at well-timed moments played into the Head of State’s space to craft the 
‘erroneous’ firing / removal of sitting DGs while ensuring that their favoured candidate was appointed. This is alleged 
to have transpired when they fought to have bids in which they had significant interests approved through the ZPPA. 
The Director for Monitoring and Compliance was said to have been a big resource in ZPPA, having served from the 
time of ZNTB. She is on record of having testified against former Minister of Tourism, Masebo for wrongly cancelling 
a tender for hunting concessions for the ZAWA (see p.55). 
At MoH, the former Head of Procurement was retired in national interest in late December 2017. Normally, the 
reasons for the retirement are not provided but the concerned individual can ideally request feedback through their 
superior / controlling officer.   
When the first bids for MoH [on ambulances] were run through the e-GP system, evaluation committee participants 
were all surprised that none of the bids met the set evaluation criteria and were thus deemed as non-responsive. 
Seeing this as a technical anomaly in the system, the HoP straightaway sort support from ZPPA. ZPPA swiftly 
responded, by going through the system and the bids. ZPPA felt this was a learning experience for all involved, 
including the technical team and the external bidders before they could settle. But there may not have been enough 
patience by all involved. It is also speculated that there was an interest in this procurement by some senior people in 
the hierarchy.  
Later, the failed procurement was re-commenced outside the e-GP.  It appears that this procurement became 
problematic again, and some dissatisfied bidders appealed to ZPPA and reported the matter to the ACC. Source: Based 
on face to face interviews and few media reports 
 
                                                          
28 http://www.itwebafrica.com/more-countries/zambia/232008-zambia-president-michael-sata-fires-public-procurement-authority-dg (accessed 
18.12.08) 
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Interviews with stakeholders suggested that whereas bureaucrats recognise the prerogative of the 
appointing authorities to hire, fire or transfer, their disquiet arises from the fact that those 
affected are not often accorded opportunity to be heard; to appeal or to be protected. Staff 
further expressed fear to make decisions due to the tense working culture; which does not seem 
supportive of learning and not amenable to divergent views. Insecurity has bred a feeling of no 
sense of permanency in the work and it was not clear that the MoH was particularly taking time 
to focus on the e-GP and the changes it would entail on its staff. 
In concluding this section on the political economy of procurement reform in Zambia, this study 
contends that prior to inception, the initiators of the e-GP could have benefited from a candid PEA 
of procurement in Zambia; accompanied with i) realistic proposals of how to address emerging 
issues; ii) and a realistic change management strategy and timeline before implementation. 
 
5.6.2. External Narrative on e-GP brighter than the Internal Narrative? 
Prior to the launch event, ZPPA reached out to multiple stakeholders, selling the e-GP; including 
informing citizens and the suppliers. For example, a week preceding the official launch, ZPPA had 
participated in the local Zambia International Trade Fair (ZITB) and used the event to disseminate 
information about the e-GP. Both the pre -launch and the launch of the e-GP received favourable 
media coverage, with the DG notably taking a lead role in the messaging. Two stakeholders 
narrated having attended ZPPA’s e-GP sensitisation workshops in Kabwe and Lusaka respectively, 
and rated it as informative. However, this narrative is only read about or head from external 
sources and not easily obtainable from within ZPPA. 
 
5.7. The e- GP Launch and beyond 
The e-GP was officially launched on 8th July 2016 by the Vice President, who had been delegated 
by the president. Some stakeholders interpreted the Vice President’s officiating at the event as a 
signal of commitment and acceptance of the project among high ranking officials in GRZ. But one 
respondentxiv observed that the unavailability of the president to preside over an important 
political event, which he had earlier confirmed he would officiate, was deliberate. It was 
speculated that could be a pointer of the tension the head of state could potentially encounter in 
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his capacity as appointing authority in addressing or calling out none or poor performance among 
MPSAs or the controlling officers. 
 
5.7.1. What counts for e-GP Success? 
Meanwhile, the definition of what e-GP success could look like was already being tested, in the 
early months following the e-GP launch. In September 2016, at an e-GP sensitization workshop for 
MoH, the former ZPPA DG reported what he described as “success of the e-GP:-” i) the number of 
suppliers (1500), who had completed a self – registration exercise on the e-GP online platform and 
ii) Five (5) tenders which had been uploaded on the e-GP system; “and another anticipated to be 
loaded by the MoH, bringing the number to Six (6)”.  While the number of registered users could 
immediately give a positive impression, it is problematic to consider this as success in the absence 
of clearly defined indicators and / or targets of success. As earlier pointed out, this is one of the 
problems which seem to haunt the e-GP, even in its current form. 
 
5.7.2. MoH and e-GP utilisation after the launch 
The e-GP pilot was initially scheduled to take place between July and September 2016 during 
which period PEs were to float and evaluate tenders online for the general public and prospective 
bidders to access, as a transparency measure.  Information regarding tenders floated on the e-GP 
is published on the ZPPA website29. However, this deadline was extended to December 2017, 
when it became apparent that PEs response to the project was not as responsive as earlier 
envisaged. Subsequently, implementation of the e-GP was further extended in order to allow for 
more PEs to run tenders on the system. There is no time limit set for the MoH or indeed any other 
PE that is part of the pilot to transition from manual to e-procurement. 
From early days, MoH was considered a forerunner in uptake of the e-GP. ZPPA staff indicated 
that MoH was one of the MPSAs which appeared to have received the e-GP well and cooperated 
with ZPPA. The former head of procurement was referred to as an example of a ‘Super User’ of e-
GP, while the then controlling officer in MoH [PS] was said to be supportive of efforts aimed at 
                                                          
29 
https://eprocure.zppa.org.zm/epps/pageIterator/view.published.notices.do?subKey=results%5B%27entriesCollection%27%5D&masterKey=129ccd5178b71c48%3A-
2777d3fc%3A165140116d4%3A-
805&paths=results%5B%27entriesCollection%27%5D&currentPath=results%5BentriesCollection%5D&actionKind=sort&sortByField=datePublished&selectedLessonIds
=&selectedPos=&hiddenPos=&paging_results_per_page=&paging_go_to_page= 
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transforming procurement. It appears that the introductory phase of the e-GP in MoH benefited 
from the authority and acceptance of the two senior officials, who embraced the project. The 
preceding narrative possibly explains the positive reports of e-procurement in MoH, reported in 
the PFMRP (DFID, 2016). Unfortunately, the positive narrative about the e-GP in MoH seemed to 
have only lasted as long as the former heads (PS and head of procurement) were in post. 
Thereafter, there is no clear indication of who replaced the two as e-GP champions within MoH. 
 
5.7.3. MoH procurements on the e-GP 
Interviews with ZPPA confirmed that utilisation of the e-GP by the pilot PEs has been dismal; too 
low to provide robust evidence for decision making by the Authority. Consequently, an earlier 
planned evaluation of the e-GP pilot was also deferred indefinitely as at December 2017. 
End of August 2018, the ZPPA website had recorded forty-two (42) tenders on the e-GP platform.  
Out of these, only ten (10) originate from MoH (see table 1). This information is slightly different 
from information which was available in December 2017, when the e-GP portal had recorded close 
to 73 tenders (table 1); out of which seven (7) originated from MoH. It is likely that between 
January 2017 and August 2018, ZPPA could have taken time to “clean up” the information posted 
on the website, hence the difference. 
 
With MoH, we observed and partly heard that procurements would be initiated and advertised on 
the e-GP system but would be awarded outside the e-GP. Box 3 below gives an example of one 
tender which had initially been floated through the e-GP but withdrawn, and later undertaken 
through the UN procurement system. 
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Box 8  The Case of Tender No 1838/2/1/2016 
 
Interviews revealed that tender number “1838/2/1/2016 on Supply and Delivery of Utility Motor Vehicles, Basic Life 
Support Ambulances, and Motor Bikes for the Reproductive, Maternal, Neo-Natal, Child Adolescent Health and 
Nutrition Project” which is indicated as cancelled had been awarded, though outside the e-GP system. 
“MoH has purchased fifty (50) ambulances at a cost of US$288,000 per ambulance. The method used is limited bidding 
(restricted to a few suppliers). This procurement method would ideally be used in an environment where there are 
limited suppliers of the goods or services sought. It seems this procurement has generated dissatisfaction among 
interested circles, leading the ACC to institute an inquiry. Meanwhile, MoH has in the procurement pipeline 50 
ambulances awarded through a South African company. Because only 10% of the purchase price has been paid, the 
supplier has withheld the vehiclesxv.”  
The Swedish Government, which is funding the Reproductive, Maternal, Neonatal, Child Adolescent Health and 
Nutrition Project, under which the cancelled tender would have been originally financed has recently bought and 
donated 25 ambulances to the MoH. 
“These are customized all terrain ambulances with life support accessories. They have been purchased by the Ministry 
through the United Nations procurement system at a unit cost of $52 550. With our joint focus on the value of money, 
of course our key principle when procuring equipment, this price level I just mentioned has enabled us to purchase in 
total the 25 ambulances.” (Swedish Ambassador to Zambia, Mr. Henrik Cederin at the handover ceremony of the 
ambulances) 22.12.2017 
 
An award outside the system is explained as one that is done after evaluation of bids and reports 
compiled from information submitted on the system; but the contract is concluded outside the 
electronic module. An award through the system would entail the contract being sent to the 
Attorney General (AG) online, after an evaluation [undertaken online] has been completed. The 
AG’s response and comments if any would be posted on the e-GP system for stakeholders to 
access. 
Table 1 on the next page shows the tenders that MoH had run on the e-GP (as at December 2017).  
It shows that three (3) of the tenders were cancelled. None responsiveness and failure by suppliers 
to submit bids on time, including complaints by suppliers were reasons cited for ‘cancellation’ of 
the three bids. It was established that the four bids which appear as being under ‘evaluation’ have 
since been awarded outside the e-GP system. 
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ZPPA indicated that it had not quality assured the outcomes of the four (4) bids which have been 
awarded outside the e-GP by MoH. It could be possible and worth some lessons to analyse the  
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Table 1: Tenders run by MoH on e-GP (December 2017) 
 
Title: 
AP Reference 
Number 
Procedure: 
CEEC Preference 
Type 
Submission 
details 
Deadline of bid 
Submission 
Financing Status 
1 Tender for the Supply and delivery of Twelve (12No.) 4X4 
Manual Double Cab Utility Motor Vehicles and One 1No. 30 
Seater Mini Bus under the World Bank and CDC COAG 
PROJECTS 
1838/2/8/201
7 
Open Bidding 
National 
No Online 08/09/2017 World Bank and 
CDC COAG 
Projects 
Evaluation 
2 Tender for Supply and Delivery of Three 4 x 4 Double Cab 
Motor Vehicles 
1838/2/6/201
7 
Open Bidding 
National 
No Online 13/04/2017 ? Evaluation 
3 Tender for the Provision of Customs Clearing Services 1838/3/5/201
6 
Open Bidding 
National 
No Online 21/12/2016 ? Evaluation 
4 Tender for Supply and Delivery of (2) 4 x 4 Automatic Utility 
Motor Vehicles for Radiation Protection Authority 
1838/2/2/201
6 
? ? Online 16/12/2016 SIDA Cancelled 
5 Tender for the Supply, Delivery, installation and 
commissioning of Medical Equipment with support from the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and 
Centre for Disease Control (CDC) Financing 
1838/2/3/201
6 
Open Bidding 
International 
No Online 23/12/2016 SIDA and CDC Evaluation 
6 Tender for Supply and Delivery of Utility Motor Vehicles, 
Basic Life Support Ambulances, and Motor Bikes for the 
Reproductive, Maternal, Neo-Natal, Child Adolescent Health 
and Nutrition Project 
 
1838/2/1/201
6 
Open Bidding 
International 
? Online 21/10/2016 Reproductive, 
Maternal, Neo 
Natal, Child 
Adolescent Health 
and Nutrition 
Project 
Cancelled 
7 Tender for Supply and Delivery of (2) 4 x 4 Automatic Utility 
Motor Vehicles for Radiation Protection Authority 
1838/2/2/201
6 
Open Bidding 
National 
? Online 16/12/2016 ? Cancelled 
 
68 
 
reports, with a view of establishing the following: i) whether the tenders met the evaluation 
criteria, ii) any appeals made and iii) reasons for the appeals, if any. 
 
5.7.4. Perverse Incentives 
The study attempted to understand why PEs such as MoH would still opt to evaluate bids manually 
as opposed to electronic evaluation.  It was speculated that the monetary sitting allowance, which 
is given as an incentive to members of the evaluation committee could be driving the evaluation 
teams to continue attending to bids outside the e-GP framework. MoH was said to have prolonged 
evaluation period of tenders. 
The “longer the evaluation time for a bid, the more money accumulated to the committee members. But 
the evaluation committees may not be the only ones who derive economic benefits from procurement. The 
beneficiaries are scattered throughout the sector and it is not possible to single out all the winners and 
losers, unless one undertakes a thoughtful mapping exercisexvi.” 
 
With regards to procurement of drugs and essential medicines, it was learnt these are done mainly 
through framework tenders and a couple of one - off tenders. While MoH’s Procurement Plan 
(updated 08.12.17) showed at least five (5) opportunities for procurement of drugs, none of these 
were sourced the e-GP. It looks like MoH missed several opportunities to experiment with drugs 
related procurement on the e-GP. 
 
5.7.5. Mixed messaging:  Manual or electronic procurement 
As a procurement method, the e-GP is currently not uniformly applied in the pilot PEs. It seems 
like procurement staff choose when it is convenient for them to use either the manual or 
electronic system, with the default likely to be the manual system. Procurement staff explained 
that the use of the e-GP is not yet officially institutionalised and that the messaging received from 
ZPPA during the e-GP introduction was that the two systems (manual and electronic) would run 
side by sidexvii. But ZPPA and WB insisted that during the pilot phase, PEs were purposefully 
encouraged to utilise the electronic system, so that information being generated could inform the 
proposed benchmarking by ZPPAxviii. 
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5.7.6. Resistance to e-GP utilisation 
Legally, the e-GP is not provided for in the PPA as a procurement tool.  Some PEs, including MoH 
were reportedly using this legal lapse as an excuse for not utilising the e-GP to conduct 
procurement. For instance, MoH ran a tender advert in the Zambia Daily Mail on 19th December 
2017, which explicitly stated that bids submitted electronically would not be honored. While the 
reasons for this exclusionary clause were not provided, it could be assumed that MoH was 
confident that the process could pass the test of the law. 
The fact that the message originated from a PE which is considered a pioneer in e-GP sends mixed 
messages. It also essentially brings into question MoH’s acceptance of electronic procurement. 
Further, interviews with one key stakeholder revealed how other MPSAs, examples of the Zambian 
Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and the Electoral Commission of Zambia have resisted using 
the e-GP, because they considered their systems as being more superior to the e-GPxix. 
This study learnt of the politics pertaining to which organisation should take the lead role in rolling 
out entire government IT, which the e-GP has subtly been exposed to. Smart Zambia, is the new 
directorate created to lead government wide IT. The Centre seems to have top political 
recognition; led by a new position of Deputy Secretary to Cabinet. The directorate is hierarchically 
located at Cabinet level, possibly signifying the amount of authority the Centre would have across 
government. Within government circles, it was said that there is a strong steer to have the e-GP 
spearheaded by Smart Zambia, a move which might take away some authority from the ZPPA. 
 
5.7.7. Procurement thresholds versus e-GP 
Information from various interviews suggests tension or resistance to using the e-GP for tenders 
valued below the ZMK500, 000 threshold and those using frameworks. Some of the reasons 
advanced for this resistance are discussed in the next paragraphs. 
 
a) Meeting SMEs’ demands 
There appears some reluctance by some procurement staff to use the e-GP (DFID, 2017), 
especially for procurements below the ZMK500, 000 thresholds. Procurement staff in both MoH 
and ZPPA explained that using the e-GP to advertise tenders below the threshold was not ideal 
because they would often be non-responsiveness; an almost ‘silent’ boycott by the SMEs. 
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Suppliers in the SME category who are the likely competitors for small value bids were said to have 
complained about being left out of the procurement business because of technological barriers. 
The SMEs have listed challenges with: i) connectivity, which includes unavailability of internet and 
slow connection and ii) limited skills to be able to use technology. 
An interview with an independent Member of Parliament (MP) for Kantanshi, who considers 
himself as a champion for SMEs confirmed some of the challenges that could lead to resistance of 
using e-Procurement. He was insistent that for e-procurement to serve its intended purpose, 
retain competitiveness and equity among others, ZPPA should innovate 
 “a procurement system that categorises users and bidders according to their socio-economic differences 
as opposed to lumping them in the same category.xx” 
 
b) Will framework contracts make it on the e-GP? 
As earlier stated, no framework contract has been advertised or been awarded through the e-GP. 
“Procurement of essential drugs and medical supplies is a separate issue from the use of the e-GP because 
drugs are often purchased through framework tenders,” indicated one respondent. 
The EU Assessment (2015) found planned procurement for essential drugs and medical supplies 
being handled through six (6) framework tenders (4 for the international and 2 for the national 
suppliers), each running for 2 years, as well as annual “one- off” tenders. The EU Assessment had 
further found that all tenders were run in accordance with the ZPPA guidelines through open 
international or national competitive biddings. 
As at 2015, all planned procurement for framework contracts had been completed by the MoH, 
while procurement of the new one-off tenders was to commence during January 2016. However, 
the MoH had opportunity to prolong the existing contracts for another two years (EU, 2015). 
Two years down the line, this study learnt that the second phase of the framework contracts had 
not been renewed. The earlier thinking and delay had been to allow for transition of the 
procurement function from MoH to MSL; after which MSL would then take over the handling of 
the frameworks. 
But information from interviews regarding the renewal process or status of frameworks was rather 
mixed; with one respondent speculating that the frameworks had expired and would not be 
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renewed while another stating that the frameworks were in the process of being renewed. 
Irrespective of the correct position, it appears like the process leading to renewal of the 
frameworks was not transparent. An immediate past supplier felt there had been a deliberate 
effort aimed at excluding them from participating in the bidding process, through inviting bids 
using “restricted tendering.” The tender was only opened up after suppliers made representations 
to ZPPA and to the Minister of Health, and an expose in one of the Daily Newspapers (Mwenda 
and Ncube, 2017). 
The implication of the expiry of the framework contracts is that MoH could be procuring drugs 
from various suppliers as and when at varying prices as opposed to fixed prices which would be 
constant if procured under a framework. Stakeholders speculate that the ‘pay as you go’ 
arrangement of procuring drugs exposes the drugs budget to manipulation by those involved. 
“There could be self-interests or incentives in this arrangement, because the circumstances for late 
renewal or re-tendering of the frameworks remain unclear, some sources have speculatedxxi”. The 
non-renewal of frameworks has arguably disadvantaged some drug suppliers who had been kept 
waiting for the renewal. 
But this alleged supposed unfair treatment of drug suppliers has gone unnoticed perhaps because 
of the limited number of players on the market and failure to report for various reasons. 
“It is the same few players in the market who can hardly complain or appeal to ZPPA for fear of victimization. 
The suppliers cannot complain or appeal to ZPPA because they do not feel protected. Staff do not feel 
protected either. The whistle blowing facilities are questionablexxii.” 
It was claimed that victimization would come through being excluded from future tenders. With 
the myriad of issues seemingly at play in the use of frameworks, it remains unclear whether 
framework contracts would soon be handled through the e-GP. 
 
5.7.8. Technology not Top Priority in Health Sector Procurement 
 
“Technology is a tool that can essentially be sorted out once major decisions are out of the wayxxiii.” 
 
Stakeholders outside ZPPA did not generally consider technology such as the e-GP as a priority in 
PEs. They tended to refer to big picture, strategic issues such: as ‘who is responsible for 
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procurement;’ ‘availability of funding;’ or ‘addressing issues such as delayed payments to SME 
suppliers’ as the major issues requiring priority attention. 
Key stakeholders in health-related procurement agree that the main procurement issues that 
confront the sector cannot be addressed through installation of an electronic system; “which is 
modelled on a solution from mature political economic contexts; very different from Zambia.” MSL for 
instance felt the institution was ready (staff, software, etc) to handle the procurement function 
once it is transferred from MoH and insisted that software is not the issue at stake, but merely a 
means to efficient procurement. Almost all stakeholders interviewed expressed skepticism about 
the Zambian government’s ability to sustain the e-GP system with continuous upgrades especially 
that the e-GP runs on commercial software. 
These variations in prioritisation of issues between ZPPA and its stakeholders, coupled with the 
diverse interests and incentives of the various stakeholders could have had a bearing on the buy- 
in, take up and eventual roll out of the e-GP. Particularly for the health sector, we learn that the 
e-GP is not considered as a priority among the pressing procurement issues. Moreover, MoH and 
MSL have had an outstanding strategic issue to resolve, which has potential to eclipse focus on 
the e-GP. 
 
5.7.9. Linking e-GP into the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) 
could make e-GP more acceptable 
Although the ideal e-GP should function as an integrated system within the government’s 
budgeting and accounting system, it currently functions as an independent system. Some of the 
stakeholders who have interacted with IFMIS or are utilising it questioned why the e-GP module 
was not linked to the IMFIS from the inception phase. Those who have utilized both the e-GP and 
IFMIS felt that because the two systems run independent of each other was increasing the 
workload of procurement staffxxiv. Integrating the e-GP into the IFMIS module, as has been done 
in the case of Rwanda could naturally enhance utilisation, unlike the current arrangement which 
seems imposed on the PEs. 
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5.7.10. Safeguarding the Procurement Profession and Watching Citizen Interests 
In view of the claims of fear and victimization of staff which emerged from respondents, the study 
attempted to understand the role of ZIPS in safeguarding professional procurement practitioners’ 
interests. A couple of respondents had also insisted that political interests in procurement were 
so prominent that they had extended to capturing ZIPS as a professional body and civil society 
organisation (CSO) watchdogs. Because Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) sits on the 
ministerial procurement committee, effort was also made to understand their perspective, given 
the foregoing assertions. 
 
a) ZIPS 
Though ZIPS dismiss the idea of being captured by political cartels, it admits limitations in as far as 
regulating practice and safeguarding procurement professionals’ interests is concerned. This 
admission is consistent with a World Bank assessment which had found that ZIPS had inadequate 
institutional capacity to regulate the procurement profession and deliver training to its members 
(World Bank, 2014:16). With regards to ZIPS’ perceived inability to speak on behalf of the officers 
who had been dismissed in ZPPA and MoH, part of the narrative from ZIPS is that members have 
not reported the allegations of ill treatment or political interference in their work to the 
institute.xxv. ZIPS seemed self-introspecting and questioned its own legitimacy to represent 
members against a background of poor member compliance, seen from the low level of 
subscription to the institute. For instance, out of an estimated 6,000 procurement practitioners, 
more than three quarters of which are from the public sector, only 500 were duly subscribed, at 
the time of the research (Mwale, C30 and Mwelwa, Cxxvi). 
 
b) CSOs – Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) 
Arising out of CSO advocacy efforts on transparency in procurement, government agreed to invite 
various CSOs to act as observers on procurement committees. This arrangement is not enshrined 
in the law but has generally been operationalized by PEs. A respondent from the private sector 
claimed that CSOs who are invited to observe procurement processes in their watchdog capacity, 
                                                          
30 http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/deduction-of-fees-at-source-good-zips/ (accessed on 26.12.18) 
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have fallen trap of co-optation by PEs.  The perception is that the CSOs have been used to rubber 
stamp irregular procurements, because they have accepted monetary allowance, which is given 
to members of the procurement committees, and that this has undermined their independence 
to challenge questionable procurement decisions. Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) is one 
of the CSOs which pushed to have the CSOs act as procurement watchers. A TIZ representative 
interviewed as part of this study agreed that there could the possibility of ‘certain’ and not ‘all’ 
CSOs being  
“co-opted; because various PEs can select CSO representatives that they want to be part of their processes. 
We are part of the process in MoH and have maintained our role as an observer and not as a member of 
the committeexxvii.” 
However, the TIZ representative felt that there points when procurement decisions seem fixed by 
those close to the processes: - 
“Public officers and suppliers know how to beat the system to such an extent that the technical proposals 
for suppliers’ bids are almost equal to the technical specifications and cost estimations done by engineers 
for road works, for examplexxviii”. 
It was noted that such scenarios left evaluation committees with no choice but to award contracts 
- based on the technical and economic strength of the proposals, [which could be fictitious] and 
likely the ones which end up being “more costly to government than the original contract valuexxix”. 
Such are the opaque aspects of procurement which an electronic system cannot identify or 
address, the TIZ representative observed. 
 
5.8. Procurement component of PFMRP characterised by dismal performance 
In order to gain a big picture perspective of how procurement reforms, specifically the e-GP 
implementation had progressed since inception, the study also tried to understand the e-GP 
through progress reports of the PFMRP. What emerges is a general picture of slow progress and 
poor performance on the procurement component, in comparison to the other seven (7) 
components in the programme. For instance, the statement below from the latest PFMRP (2018) 
first quarter report shows limited traction on the component: - 
“…..the e-GP is functioning well in most of the piloted institutions and that it is now being further rolled out. 
The e-GP has been implemented in eleven (11) PEs. By close of 2017, all PEs implementing e-GP had 
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published Procurement Plans through the e-GP while nine (9) out of the pilot PEs had published an open 
tender on the system e-GP” (MoF / PFMRP, 2018). 
The limited progress being made on the e-GP implementation could be an indication that the 
project is struggling to achieve results. The fact that only nine 9 PEs had published tenders on the 
e-GP appears too low an accomplishment for a project which is aspiring for nationwide roll-out, to 
close to four hundred and fifty (450) PEs. 
 
5.9. Key Actors (individuals and organisations) in e-GP and reform window 
Like other reforms, the e-GP could have been impacted on by the turnover of key actors, from 
design to implementation, and possibly also by some inertia within the bureaucracy.  Figure 3 
below attempts to depict the history of individuals and organisations involved in the e-GP / 
procurement reforms since 2010.   
 
The year 2010 was significant because it was about conceptualizing the overall public finance 
reform agenda, informed by the PEFA assessment. In 2011, two key events in the context: - i) ZPPA 
transitioning and ii) the coming in of a new government seemed to have coincided to create what 
could have been interpreted as an opportunity for reform.  
 
But it was only in 2013 when the reform agenda appeared to have taken off, with relatively new 
individuals on both donor organisations and GRZ sides.  For instance (DFID, Finland and World 
Bank had relatively new officers in post) and GRZ had a Minister of Finance seemingly supportive 
of bureaucrats on GRZ’s side. Former Finance Minister Chikwanda, was said to have provided 
public servants their professional space and supported their decisionsxxx. The PS – Budget and 
Economic Affairs in MoF is said to have seemingly earned the confidence of counterparts on the 
CPs side; and was able to bring them together and agree the PFMRP documentxxxi. 
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Figure 3:  Timeline of Individual and Organisational Actors in the e-GP 
 
Though the donors (DFID, Germany, Finland and World Bank) could not agree on every single 
reform agenda, they ultimately pooled their collective interests and signed up to the PFMRP-
MDTF. For instance, while DFID was instrumental in the PFMRP design and set up, it did not 
particularly agree that the e-GP would succeed in the absence of basic IT infrastructure. But more 
so because the lessons from IFMIS were not promising enough to back investment in an IT based 
reform component. The WB staff however, who had expertise in IT and Finance were supportive 
of the idea of piloting e-procurement.  WB staff were also willing to have ZPPA run with the e-
procurement proposal, to which they offered to provide accompanying TA through the life of the 
programmexxxii.  
With WB as administrator and TA provider, the MDTF became the coalescing and financing 
instrument for both GRZ and CPs. The PS MoF chaired the Technical Committee of the MDTF, 
which meet quarterly to discuss technical issues while matters of a strategic nature are discussed 
at the Steering Committee level, chaired by the Secretary to Treasury.  
But the plans and relationships built on the PFMRP MDTF were probably too short-lived to witness 
the e-GP implemented as envisaged, due to reasons such as change in political guard, as in the 
case of GRZ, which entailed some key individuals being fired or retired; or end of contract tenure 
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as was the case with a number of individuals on donors’ side. While ZPPA has had a fair share of 
changes, both DGs seem to have given the e-GP support, evidenced by the level of engagement in 
the various events surrounding it. 
Given the foregoing history of individual and organizational actors on the e-GP, it appears that the 
e-GP was an alliance between donors, especially the World Bank and a few committed within 
government (MoF and the ZPPA). Once the individuals moved on, progress on the e-GP seemed 
to stall or drag. 
 
5.10. Conclusion of chapter 
In concluding this chapter, this study contends that prior to inception, the initiators of the e-GP 
could have benefited from a candid PEA of procurement reforms in Zambia; accompanied with i) 
realistic proposals of how to address emerging issues; ii) and a realistic change management 
strategy and timeline before implementation.  
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6. CHAPTER 6  CONCLUSION: ISOMORPHIC MIMICRY IN THE E-GP 
 
As a procurement instrument, it seems like the e-GP has only been rhetorically welcome in MoH. 
There is little evidence to demonstrate that stakeholders at various levels have accepted it and are 
committed to ensuring its success. Interests and incentives of stakeholders appear to be at the 
core of success or failure of the e-GP as a procurement tool. Though not visibly manifest, the e-GP 
has more ‘blockers’ and ‘fewer supporters’ across the procurement spectrum.  Because the 
political stakes in procurement are high, the e-GP, or indeed wider procurement reforms seem to 
survive at the goodwill of a few supporters, who may have accepted the project and may have 
limited levels of authority to make changes within their spaces. 
Progress on the e-GP seems manifest more in the relative ability of the ZPPA to pull and push some 
strands of work within the few pilot PEs, while the other PEs are in theory part of the process. PEs 
and external stakeholders are hindered to fully utilise the e-GP partly due to technological barriers 
such as unstable internet connections or limited access to computer hardware.  Available data 
shows that ZPPA is the main user of the e-GP, and not the PEs for which the system is clearly 
intended to add value. Because there are traces of utilisation of the system by the ZPPA and a 
couple of committed PEs, the overall picture of limited traction is masked. 
The foregoing scenario seems to disguise the relative ability of ZPPA to exert pressure on the PEs 
and some of the capacity limitations of the ZPPA to transfer knowledge and skill to the PEs. There 
appear low levels of acceptance of the e-GP particularly in MoH and widely in PEs. It is unclear that 
the path being taken for the e-GP reforms can transform procurement processes and outcomes 
given the context of limited broad-based support. What seems to be transpiring is token 
acceptance of this reform effort in public rhetoric; which is however hardly matched with 
corresponding action. Besides, the reform is clearly lacking leadership at ministerial or cabinet 
level. 
While the e-GP was conceived with the aim of reducing human interface in procurement processes 
and procedures to enhance transparency, credibility, and VfM, implementation this far suggest 
that the reforms are falling short of the intended objectives (Crown Agents, 2018).  Consequently, 
this study associates the e-GP to isomorphic mimicry, a situation where “…-governments and 
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organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like rather than 
what they actually do” (Andrews et al 2013). 
A similar conclusion can be made of the wider procurement reforms. There has not been an audit 
or evaluation of the reforms since decentralization of the ZPPA to be able to concretely gauge if 
the reforms are living up to the objectives. However, the PEFA scores of 2012 and 2018 rate 
procurement reforms low. Challenges of transparency were significant procurement information 
is not made available publicly; and lack of an independent appeals procedure and an appeals body 
are some of the examples cited in studies (DFID, 2017), which this study also found.  
Using the MoH example, we also observe that opportunities for attaining VfM in procurement i.e 
through what appears to be limited use of framework contracts or absence of prices for common 
items are lost. A recent (DFID, 2017) report has documented these missed opportunities of 
ensuring VfM in public procurement in Zambia. However, it is reassuring to note that stakeholders 
in procurement, especially ZPPA acknowledge the foregoing weaknesses and there is evidence of 
a conversation regarding them taking place. What is evidently lacking is implementation of actions 
leading to concrete resolution of the identified weaknesses or existing policies.  
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group of powerful business people commonly referred to in Zambian politics as ‘the cartel’.  Wynter later formed 
the Rainbow Party and contested for presidency against Lungu in 2016.  
iii GBM is said to have been the main benefactor of Sata and the PF before and just after 2011. He was appointed 
Defence Minister in 2011. Perceived rivalry between GBM and Wynter is said to have cost GBM his ministerial 
position. He joined the opposition UPND after being fired by Sata.  
iv Chishimba Kambwili is a founder member of PF under Sata, and served as Minister in Sata and Lungu’s 
governments. He last served as   Information and Broadcasting Minister untill he was fired by Lungu in 2017. It was 
speculated that Kambwili had intention to challenge the president in the next General elections (2021). Kambwili 
identifies with the National Democratic Congress. His parliamentary seat under the PF has been withdrawn and he 
has mounted a challenge in the courts of law. 
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